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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of trade secrets protects ingenuity that produces a com-
mercial advantage and remains confidential.' The entrepreneur
whose trade secret is stolen is entitled to monetary damages and an
injunction framed to preserve the commercial advantage created by
the trade secret. Despite more than 150 years of common law develop-
ment in England and the United States, and a uniform act proposed to
improve trade secret law, the courts' calculations of the length of this
injunctive relief remain inconsistent and inaccurate.
Broadly speaking, there are two models for calculating an injunc-
tive period, and both are flawed. The older approach restrains the
misappropriator of the trade secret from using or disclosing the trade
secret for an apparently unlimited period.2 Sometimes these injunc-
tions are expressly perpetual. More often they are simply unlimited
on their face and either contain no reference to later termination or
authorize later reconsideration without providing any useful standard
to determine when they should be dissolved. This approach is ex-
pressly favored in about a half dozen states and is applied intermit-
tently in many more.3 While this temporally unlimited injunction is
generally justified as punitive, some adherents see it as only compen-
satory; the enjoined party misappropriated the trade secret and cannot
establish that it would ever have developed the technology absent the
misappropriation. 4
1. Trade secrets represent one of four general types of intellectual achievement pro-
tected by law and commonly characterized as "intellectual property." The others
are patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Patents protect commercial ideas (such
as the Wrights' airplane technology), copyrights protect expressions of ideas but
not the ideas themselves (such as books and paintings), and trademarks (such as
Xerox and Thermos) protect expressions that consumers come to identify with
the source of particular goods. Trade secrets overlap only intermittently with
copyrights (primarily with respect to computer software) and virtually never
with trademarks. Trade secrets and patents do not cover the same ranges of tech-
nology but do overlap to a significant degree. An inventor whose idea qualifies
for patent protection (which requires a high standard of novelty, among other
things) can try to keep the idea secret or obtain a patent. The trade secret will
last until the secrecy is lost or until competitors generally become aware of the
technology. Thus, the period of a trade secret can vary dramatically. A patent,
on the other hand, ensures a legally protectible technology for a period of years-
usually seventeen-after which the technology is available to all. In addition,
once the patent is granted the technology is disclosed in the patent, and the se-
crecy necessary to maintain a trade secret is lost.
2. See notes 59-65 & accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 79, 82, 106-09 & accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 93-94, 154-55 & accompanying text infra.
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The second approach attempts to determine the period of commer-
cial advantage or "head start" provided by the trade secret and enjoins
the misappropriator for that period. This type of injunction is com-
monly called a "lead-time" injunction, and lead time is generally con-
sidered the temporal advantage obtained by the misappropriator over
competitors attempting legitimately to replicate the trade secret tech-
nology.5 These jurisdictions have not developed an accurate or uni-
form model for calculating the lead time. Most jurisdictions profess to
employ the lead-time model, apparently including the 37 states that
have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), but both com-
mon law and UTSA jurisdictions have notable lapses that authorize
facially unlimited injunctions.6 The failure to develop consistent,
comprehensive, and commercially realistic standards for fashioning
compensatory lead-time injunctions leads to haphazard assessments of
the commercial advantage obtained by the misappropriator.
The inadequacy of the compensatory model also distorts the incen-
tives to award perpetual or indefinite injunctions. When a court faces
a bad faith misappropriator, the court's current choice is between an
amorphous lead-time remedy apt to undercompensate the trade secret
owner and a punitive or ill-defined indefinite injunction apt to
overcompensate the trade secret owner. It should come as no surprise
that many courts continue to award indefinite injunctions.
A careful review of the standards for injunctive relief can and
should be applied in a new injunctive model to achieve awards that
fully compensate the trade secret holder by placing the trade secret
holder and the misappropriator in the positions they would have been
in absent the misappropriation. Commercial reality suggests four cru-
cial improvements to the current standards.
First, the courts must replace the objective question of how long an
5. See notes 71-76 & accompanying text infra.
6. In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ap-
proved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and 37 states have enacted some
version of UTSA. 14 U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 1992). The Act sought to codify "the better
reasoned" common law cases and strike a middle ground. UTSA Prefatory Note,
14 U.L.A. 433, 435 (1985). UTSA requires the termination of injunctions when a
court determines that a trade secret has terminated, except that a court may en-
join a misappropriator for an additional period "to eliminate commercial advan-
tage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation." UNIF. TRADE
SEcRETs AcT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 449 (1985). UTSA's interpretation is a focal point in
the development of trade secrets law. Unfortunately, as discussed below, while
UTSA's provisions would support an accurate compensatory model for framing
injunctive relief, the drafters' comments appear to champion an erroneous objec-
tive standard that looks to competitors' capabilities rather than the misap-
propriator itself. UNIF. TRADE SEcRETS AcT § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 450 (1985); see
notes 80-83 & accompanying text infra. Indeed, courts within UTSA jurisdictions
mirror the common law's divisions, some providing perpetual injunctions and
others "lead-time" injunctions. See notes 80-83 & accompanying text infra.
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independent third party would take to develop the trade secret with a
subjective test and determine the time necessary for the misap-
propriator itself to develop the trade secret through legitimate efforts.
The commercial advantage gained by the defendant may differ from
the average competitor. If the misappropriator cannot prove that it
would have legitimately replicated the technology in a definite period,
the misappropriator should be enjoined from using the trade secret
until and unless the misappropriator legitimately replicates the prod-
uct or process independently of the misappropriated trade secret
information.
Second, courts are divided regarding how to calculate the injunc-
tive period.7 Some courts commence the period on the date the misap-
propriation occurred and award an injunction only for the portion of
the period that remains, if any, on the date of final judgment when the
injunction is awarded. This approach is apt to reward the swift thief.
Other courts arbitrarily commence the period on the date of the final
judgment even though the misappropriator might have commenced le-
gitimate replication prior to this date. This approach may overcom-
pensate the trade secret holder. Yet others use the date the trade
secret terminated through public disclosure. Courts should replace
this haphazard muddle with a straightforward test that determines
when the misappropriator would have commenced legitimate replica-
tion absent the misappropriation. The court can then accurately de-
termine when legitimate replication would have been completed and
measure that date against the date the misappropriator actually
reached the market.8 This is the period of commercial advantage. An
injunction for this period should be awarded, which will commence at
final judgment. This holds the misappropriator out of the market for
the same length of time that it had an unfair advantage in the market.
Third, the courts developing lead-time remedies have unnecessa-
rily and inappropriately shied away from giving effect to the rational
inferences one can draw from bad faith misappropriations. Absent
7. See notes 98-101 & accompanying text in;fra.
8. It may be helpful to show this schematically:
Date of Date product is marketed
misappropriation using the misappropriated
trade secret
Date legitimate Date product would
replication would have been marketed
have commenced absent absent misappropriation
misappropriation
Length of injunction
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contrary evidence, it is reasonable to infer from an intentional or reck-
less decision to misappropriate that the defendant could not have le-
gitimately and profitably developed the trade secret. Given these
rational inferences, and the often highly speculative nature of deter-
mining the lead time, the bad faith misappropriator should face an in-
definite injunction that lasts until it legitimately replicates the trade
secret, unless the misappropriator can rebut this presumption and es-
tablish its ability to recreate the technology in a particular period.
Fourth, courts need to recognize that the time necessary to develop
the trade secret technology is not a constant value independent of
other factors. The development of trade secret technology requires
the investment of many forms of capital. The requisite time necessar-
ily varies with the amount of talent, labor, money, equipment, and
other capital invested in the process. This analysis will result in indef-
inite injunctions against misappropriators with insufficient resources
to develop the trade secret technology legitimately. Those with
greater resources might face shorter injunctions but would pay the
trade secret holder the monetary savings achieved by using the trade
secret technology. This will result in a range of acceptable injunctive
periods that vary inversely with the quantity of other forms of capital
investment.
This article first recounts the history of trade secret protection and
the concerns and policies that have determined its scope. The article
next focuses specifically on the history of injunctive relief, and how
the current remedial models remain unsatisfactory. The article con-
cludes by establishing that deference to commercial reality allows the
construction of a model that accurately places the parties in the posi-
tions they would have held absent the misappropriation.
The proposed model relies on principles fundamental to both
UTSA and the common law, and is no less efficient than the current
models for determining injunctive relief. Correcting the compensa-
tory model should also remove the incentive for granting perpetual or
unbridled indefinite injunctions. The indefinite injunction and the
lead-time injunction are not as foreign to each other as the bar and the
academy commonly assume. The proposed model reveals their com-
mon attributes and ties them together in a standard that should re-
solve the long-standing conflicts in fashioning trade secret injunctions.
Jurisdictions can apply this model to solve the vexing and hitherto
intractable problem of determining an appropriate period of injunc-
tive relief in trade secret cases.
II. THE HISTORY OF TRADE SECRETS: SURVEYING THE
FOREST IN SPITE OF THE TREES
Absent any punitive aspects, the goal of remedies for trade secret
misappropriation is to provide the plaintiff the commercial advantage
19931
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that would have existed had there been no misappropriation. Punitive
concerns, however, have always had a place in trade secret remedies.
Trade secret law has long awarded punitive relief against trade secret
misappropriators. An early Illinois case allowed the trade secret
holder to calculate damages based on the extent to which the misap-
propriator intended to injure the holder rather than on the actual in-
jury suffered.9
Today, the Uniform Trade Secrets Actlo authorizes an award of the
trade secret holder's attorney's fees and twice its actual damages if a
misappropriation was willful and malicious." These remedies provide
courts significant power to punish bad faith misappropriators. Incor-
porating a rationally based, consistent (and therefore predictable) pu-
nitive component into injunctive relief is more troublesome.
Perpetual injunctive relief, although predictable, would lump together
all gradations of bad faith, without opportunity for mitigation from a
drastic remedy. Doubling the injunction's length would be consistent
only at a highly superficial level, because doubling the period would
have remarkably different effects in different factual settings. Com-
mentators, therefore, generally decry punitive injunctions.' 2
Courts and commentators have often characterized indefinite and
perpetual injunctions as punitive.' 3 This characterization is simplistic.
As this article discusses,14 the current model for calculating injunctive
relief often undercompensates the trade secret holder by assuming the
misappropriator could and would have legitimately reverse-engi-
neered the trade secret absent the misappropriation. The benefit of
the doubt goes to the misappropriator. Perpetual injunctions, and in-
definite injunctions that are not later limited, may also have a com-
pensatory element. They may proceed from the assumption that the
misappropriator could not or would not have reverse engineered the
trade secret absent the misappropriation.' 5 The continuing willing-
ness of courts to issue indefinite injunctions may reflect this compen-
9. Hildreth v. Hancock, 55 Ill. App. 572 (1894), aff'd, 41 N.E. 155 (Ill. 1895).
10. See note 80 & accompanying text infra.
11. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 3, 4, 14 U.L.A. 455, 459 (1985).
12. E.g., UNiF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 450 (1985); M. Barclay, Com-
ment, Trade Secrets: How Long Should an Injunction Last, 26 UCLA L. REV. 203,
211-12, 276 (1978); J. Berryhill, Trade Secret Litigation" Injunctions and Other
Equitable Remedies, 48 CoLo. L. REv. 189, 204 (1977). But see Comment, Trade
Secret Misappropriation: What is the Proper Length of an Injunction After Pub-
lic Disclosure, 51 ALBANY L. REV. 271, 290 (1987)(punitive injunction appropriate
where willful and malicious conduct shown); Note, Limiting Trade Secret Protec-
tion, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 725 (1988)(perpetual injunction appropriate where trade
secret contains patent-like novelty).
13. E.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 750 (1985); see Barclay, supra
note 12 at 211-12, 216; Berryhill, supra note 12, at 206.
14. See notes 90-91 & accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 91-95 & accompanying text infra.
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satory motivation more than a desire to punish. This article proposes
to refine the compensatory analysis to avoid undercompensation and
to reduce the incentive to award punitive relief. To fashion an appro-
priate compensatory remedy, it is necessary to understand the scope of
the rights protected by the law as trade secrets.
A. Early Development of Trade Secrets
Trade secrets are of venerable lineage. As with most common law
doctrines, they can be traced to English precedents. In Williams v.
Williams,16 a son sold medicines for his own account, although he had
prepared them from formulas given to him by his father on the under-
standing that the two would use the formulas for their joint benefit.
The Chancery trial court issued an injunction restraining the son from
using or divulging the trade secret and from selling the medicines.17
On appeal, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, agreed that it was proper
to require the son, by injunction, to fulfill the contract of partnership
with his father or return the medicines. Lord Eldon noted, however,
that enforcing an injunction to maintain a secret regarding unpatented
medicines would, on general principles, require "very great considera-
tion."' 8 The Lord Chancellor did not decide this question, however,
because he dissolved the injunction on the grounds that the son had
already divulged the technology and there was no secret remaining to
protect, and that the son had controverted the facts supporting the
original injunction.19
Three years later, in Yovatt v. Winyard,20 the English courts first
enforced an injunction to maintain secrecy. The defendant had been
employed as a journeyman to a veterinarian. The defendant surrepti-
tiously copied the plaintiff's recipes and instructions for the manufac-
ture and use of various medicines. When the defendant set up a
competing practice, Lord Eldon issued an injunction that restrained
the defendant from using or communicating the recipes or instruc-
16. 3 Mer. 157, 36 Eng. Rep. 61 (1817).
17. Id. at 157, 36 Eng. Rep. at 61.
18. Id. at 160, 36 Eng. Rep. at 62. In support of this proposition, Lord Eldon cited his
earlier opinion in Newbery v. James, 2 Mer. 446 (1817), in which he held that a
covenant to maintain two secrets for medicines to treat gout, rheumatism, and
fevers could not be enforced. One was the subject of an expired patent, and the
patent had disclosed the secret. The other, according to Lord Eldon, could not be
enforced because the secret would be lost through the necessity of disclosing it in
court. Lord Eldon did not address this difficulty when, three years later, he af-
firmed the grant of an injunction to protect a trade secret in Yovatt. He was
perhaps moved to ignore this perceived problem on the basis of a distinction
urged by counsel, that the secret was freely communicated to the defendant in
Williams, but was wrongfully obtained, without the permission of the trade se-
cret owner, by the defendant in Yovatt v. Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425, 426 (1820).
19. Williams v. Williams, 3 Mer. 157, 160, 36 Eng. Rep. 61, 62 (1817).
20. 1 Jac. & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820).
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tions, and based the relief on the defendant's "breach of trust and
confidence."21
The early cases pondered whether the court had equitable jurisdic-
tion to enforce a contract that required someone to refrain from di-
vulging a secret. This jurisdictional concern was soundly rejected as
early as 1846, in the case of Dietrichsen v. Cabburn, where Lord
Chancellor Cottenham noted that no branch of equity requires more
discretion than injunctions but that none is more beneficial, and juris-
diction reaches to enforce all agreements to abstain from performing
an act, including abstention from divulging trade secrets.23
These early cases recognized multiple legal bases for the protection
of trade secrets, including not only the law of contract, but also the
law of property and the obligations of tort or "trust or confidence,
meaning as I conceive, that the Court fastens the obligation on the
conscience of the party."24
21. Id. at 395, 37 Eng. Rep. at 426; accord Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng. Rep.
492 (1851)(enforcing contract to maintain confidence by enjoining use or disclo-
sure of the trade secret), aff'd, 21 L. J. Chanc. 248 (1852).
22. 2 Ph. 52, 41 Eng. Rep. 861 (1846).
23. Id. at 57-58, 41 Eng. Rep. at 863 (citing Yovatt), see also Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare
241, 255-56, 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 498-99 (1851)(noting that whatever the legal
grounds, contract, property, or trust and confidence, the authorities leave no
doubt that jurisdiction exists to enjoin the maintenance of trade secrets); Bryson
v. Whitehead, 1 Sim. & St. 7, 57 Eng. Rep. 29, 31 (1822)(enforcing a contractual
covenant to maintain a trade secret).
24. Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241,255, 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 498 (1851)(restraining the use
or disclosure of secret medicinal formulas); cf. Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. &
G. 25, 46, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1179 (1849)(upholding an injunction restraining de-
fendants from displaying sketches they had misappropriated from Queen Victoria
and Prince Albert, who had drawn them and kept them in their private apart-
ments; the court noted that it had the power to enjoin conduct not only on the
grounds of breach of contract or confidence but also to protect property and the
right of privacy); Green v. Folgham, 1 Sim. & St. 398,407-08,57 Eng. Rep. 159,162-
63 (1823)(enforcing an accounting for a trust whose value was created by the
maintenance of trade secrets for eye medicines); Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 Hall
& Twells 28,40,47 Eng. Rep. 1313,1318 (1824)(Eldon, L.)(refusing to enjoin publi-
cation of misappropriated lectures on the ground of copyright or contract but en-
joining publication on the ground that the notes of the lectures had been obtained
in "such a manner as this Court would not allow of publication," the "manner"
inferentially constituting a breach of confidence, as assumed by Vice-Lord Chan-
cellor Turner in Morison).
It is important to note that the courts quickly recognized that the "property
right" in the trade secret was substantially limited by the requirement that the
idea remain secret. The property right is lost once the idea becomes public. E.g.,
Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dedds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 144 (Ohio Sup. Ct.
1887)(Taft, J., later United States Chief Justice). The property approach never-
theless retains many adherents, although others rely exclusively on tort and con-
tract principles. Compare E.. Dupont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244
U.S. 100, 102 (1917)(dictum rejecting property rights analysis) with Ruckelhaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004 (1984)(holding that trade secrets under Missouri
law were property protected by the Fifth Amendment's takings clause); see gen-
[Vol. 72:515
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In the United States, the trade secret doctrine was originally exclu-
sively the domain of state law and remains primarily a state law doc-
trine.25 The trade secret holder's right to be protected from a breach
of trust and confidence by means of injunctive relief was apparently
first applied in the United States by Massachusetts in Peabody v. Nor-
folk.26 There a machinist, Norfolk, contracted not to disclose the
plaintiff's process for manufacturing gunny sack cloth from jute, but
took those secrets to a new employer. The court issued an injunction
against Norfolk, requiring him not to use or disclose the trade
secrets.27 The plaintiff then sought an injunction in a supplemental
bill against the new employer, who filed a general demurrer claiming
there was no cause of action that would allow a trade secrets injunc-
tion against him. The court overruled the demurrer on the ground
that it was "well established by authority" that equity jurisdiction ex-
tended to "interfere by injunction" to protect an inventor in his secret
property from those who obtain it or disclose it by breach of contract
or confidence. 28
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the core aspects of the
current trade secret doctrine were identified.29 Injunctive relief was
early recognized as appropriate.3 0 An inventor has exclusive rights in
erally B. Kugler, Limiting Trade Secret Protection, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 725,739-43
(1988) (reviewing history of property rights as a basis for protecting trade secrets).
25. Federal law has developed regarding trade secrets in areas where the federal gov-
ernment exercises significant commercial control, primarily government con-
tracts and international trade. E.g., Dowty Decoto, Inc. v. Department of the
Navy, 883 F.2d 774,781 (9th Cir. 1989)(applying the Federal Trade Secrets Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1905, to determine in a government contract whether the claimed trade
secrets in "holdback bars" used for carrier launches of aircraft were the property
of the government, and holding that they were the property of the private con-
tractor because they were developed by the private contractor at the contractor's
risk and expense); Viscofan, SA. v. ITC, 787 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986)(affirming
remedial order based on the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1337a, and ap-
plying federal common law on trade secrets, following state authority, to enjoin
importation of skinless sausage casings developed by Viscofan based on Viscofan's
misappropriation of Union Carbide's trade secrets); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(1992) (providing Administrative Procedure Act exclusion for trade secrets confi-
dentially provided to federal agencies).
26. 98 Mass. 452 (1868); see generally M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2 (concise
discussion of trade secrets history).
27. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 454 (1868).
28. Id. at 458.
29. See 2 J. STORY, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 952 (6th ed. 1853).
30. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 47 N.Y. 435, 441-42, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 115
(1892)(expressly addressing jurisdiction to enjoin); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass.
452, 454, 458 (1868)(affirming injunction against departed employee and overrul-
ing demurrer allowing claim for injunctive relief against firm that allegedly ob-
tained trade secret through departed employee); Champlin v. Stoddart, 30 Hun.
300, 302 (App. N.Y. 1883)(general term appellate decision)(same); Salomon v.
Hertz, 2 A. 379, 381 (N.J. 1886)(issuing injunction); Hammer v. Barnes, 26 How.
1993]
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her invention until it becomes generally available to the public.31
Trade secrets can be protected or conveyed by express contract.32
They also are protected through a generally implied condition of em-
ployment to maintain the employer's confidences, even after the end
of the employment.33 Tort law also imposes a duty to respect intellec-
tual achievements of commercial value that the holder maintains in
confidence.34
The primary policy motivation for judicial protection of trade
secrets, whether by contract or tort principles, has been reasonably
straightforward from the beginning. The law encourages commercial
development by protecting any advantage gained by an inventor's own
efforts and ingenuity, as long as she takes reasonable steps to maintain
the confidentiality of her work.3 5 This judicial support helps maintain
standards of "commercial morality" necessary to safeguard a success-
ful entrepreneur's reward.36 From the earliest cases, the courts have
justified the award of relief by arguing that the success of commerce
requires a judicial remedy for violations of the trust and confidences of
the inventor, especially by employees.3 7 Protection of this commercial
advantage requires that the trade secret holder be made whole, that is,
the trade secret holder and the misappropriator should be placed in
the positions they would have reached absent the misappropriation.
As trade secret law developed, it rubbed elbows with other policy
concerns. Some of these were provisions of positive law, such as the
federal constitutional and statutory protection for patents, and the
federal statutory trust-busting statutes, the Clayton and Sherman an-
Pr. 174,176 (N.Y. Sup. 1863)(overruling demurrer on ground that court had juris-
diction to issue injunction to protect trade secret misappropriation).
31. Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12,12 (N.Y. 1889)(holding that a cause of action existed
to enjoin the use of misappropriated patterns for a pump, even though the pump
itself was publicly available).
32. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 526-27 (1837)(holding that a contract to convey
unpatented trade secrets regarding chocolate manufacture was valid and enforce-
able, even though various other isolated individuals might know the same art,
and ordering the defendant to pay damages on a bond he executed as security for
his promise to convey the secret).
33. 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Toloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 141-43 (Mich. 1897).
34. Stone v. Goss, 55 A. 736 (N.J. 1903)(holding that third party who used trade secret
with knowledge of breach of confidence was equally liable with original misap-
propriator, even though ignorant of express contract between misappropriator
and original employer to maintain confidence); Westervelt v. National Paper &
Supply Co., 57 N.E. 552 (Ind. 1900); O.W. Thum Co. v. Toloczynski, 72 N.W. 140,
14143 (Mich. 1897).
35. Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co., 57 N.E. 552 (Ind. 1900); Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Reichenbach, 47 N.Y. 435, 437, 441-43, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 112, 114-16 (1892).
36. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 47 N.Y. 435, 439 (1892).
37. Id. at 442-43; Yovatt v. Winyard, 27 Eng. Rep. 425, 426 (1820)(awarding injunction
where the defendant first wrongfully obtained the trade secret); Morison v. Moat,
68 Eng. Rep. 492, 493, 503 (1851)(awarding injunction where proper acquisition
followed by breach of trust).
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titrust acts. Courts were concerned to prevent trade secret law from
becoming a back-door opportunity to gain a monopoly that would
otherwise be prohibited by patent or antitrust requirements. This
concern was expressed in the earliest cases,38 but by the early twenti-
eth century there was general agreement that the secrecy element in
the definition of trade secrets allowed room for trade secret protection
that did not undercut patent law. 9 Nor did trade secrets violate the
common law's prohibition against unlawful restraints of trade 40
Courts similarly held that the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts did
not preempt state trade secret law.4
38. E.g., Deming v. Chapman, 11 How. 382, 384 (1854)(holding that patent law
preempts trade secret claim); see Williams v. Williams, 36 Eng. Rep. 61, 62 (1817).
39. Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391-92 (1929)(holding that
state court had jurisdiction to decide who held title to patent obtained using sto-
len trade secret, and assuming validity of trade secrets despite federal patent
law); Stone v. Goss, 55 A. 736 (N.J. 1903)(holding that trade secret for depilatories
deserved protection because its novelty was similar to patentable novelty); Ham-
mer v. Barnes, 26 How. Pr. 174, 176 (N.Y. Sup. 1863)(overruling demurrer assert-
ing that patent law denied state court jurisdiction over trade secret claim). Given
the general recognition that trade secrets law was not preempted by patent law,
the United States Supreme Court did not deign to decide the issue expressly until
1973. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). Before Kewanee,
four circuits had held that trade secrets were not preempted. In Kewanee, the
Sixth Circuit broke rank and held that they were, and the Supreme Court
stepped in to resolve the conflict, determining that trade secrets are not
preempted.
40. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 527 (1837)("[I]t is of no consequence to the public
whether the secret art be used by the plaintiff or by the defendant."); Peabody v.
Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 460 (1868); Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 98 (1889)(enforcing
contract to maintain trade secrets in confidence); see also Bryson v. Whitehead, 57
Eng. Rep. 29, 31 (1822)(holding that maintenance of trade secret confidentiality
by contract not a restraint of trade under English common law); cf Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)(recognizing right to
enforce contract requiring distributors to maintain the trade secret in confidence
but holding void as against public policy the holder's attempt to restrain trade by
including a provision purporting to set wholesale and retail prices). Jager's re-
search suggests that Vickery is the first trade secrets case reported in the United
States and Peabody the first case protecting a trade secret by issuing an injunc-
tion. Jager, supra note 26, at 2-6. This author has not discovered any earlier
cases.
41. E.g., United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41,219 (D. Del.
1953)(proper standard for testing licensing arrangements for trade secrets is
whether they are "ancillary" and "reasonable" restraints upon commerce, or a
subterfuge for establishing an illegal restraint); c-f Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262-65 (1979)(holding that a royalty to be paid for use of an
unpatented trade secret was enforceable even after the trade secret was disclosed,
distinguishing antitrust limitations on patent royalties to be paid after the patent
expired); see generally W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
LAW §§ 25-29 (July 1992)(reviewing antitrust restraints on trade secret market-
ing). In this area the issue has not been whether all trade secret protection is
preempted by antitrust law, but instead what limitations does antitrust law re-
quire in the marketing of products that incorporate trade secrets? The courts
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One other crucial concern that tends to limit trade secret protec-
tion is not based on a specific statute, but is instead a general policy
concern that trade secret law must not prevent people from practicing
their professions. Free and vigorous competition in the labor market
and fundamental fairness both require that employees be allowed to
capitalize on their development of expertise. Courts early recognized
the need to draw the line between legitimate protection of trade
secrets or confidential information and attempts to restrain trade or
employees' freedom.42
B. The Modem Definitions
The early cases balanced these policy concerns in determining the
showing necessary to establish a trade secret, and courts still expend
much of their analytical effort balancing these policy concerns case by
case. The early definitions remain recognizable in the still quite gen-
eral modern definitions. There have been two attempts in the twenti-
eth century to establish a uniform framework for considering rights in
trade secrets. The first is found in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
and the comment thereto, which defines a trade secret as a secret re-
garding "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information"
that provides an advantage over competitors. 43 The secret may have
the novelty required of a patent, but it need not.44 Even if it is clearly
anticipated in the prior art, its secrecy can be protected as long as it
provides some commercial advantage. The Restatement canvases the
cases that discuss the bases for trade secrets and concludes that the
property right basis has been rejected, and that the duty is more ap-
propriately considered a general tort requirement of good faith.
Breaches of this duty, whether of contract, confidence, or improper
have generally placed upon trade secrets the same marketing constraints to
which patents are subject.
42. This balance was originally struck with an emphasis toward the protection of em-
ployers and has engendered substantial commentary in this century suggesting
alterations to expand protection for employees. See note 84 infra. E.g., Keeler v.
Taylor, 53 Pa. 467, 468-70 (1866)(voiding an agreement as "in restraint of trade
and industry" where it bound an employee to pay his original employer $50 for
every scale he sold throughout his life, even after setting up his own business,
noting that there was no contention that the employer's process for manufactur-
ing scales was an "invention" rather than a "handicraft"); Salomon v. Hertz, 2 A.
379, 381 (N.J. 1886)(affirming preliminary injunction restraining use or disclosure
of trade secret but dissolving preliminary injunction restraining employees from
use or disclosure of suppliers of former employer); O.W. Thum Co. v. Toloczyn-
ski, 72 N.W. 140, 141-44 (Mich. 1897)(discussing limits of legitimate competition).
CY Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Schott Segner & Co., 3 Ch. 447, 453
(1892)(enforcing three-year world-wide covenant not to compete in manufacture
and sale of aniline colors, tar products, and the like, on the ground that to void
the contract would unnecessarily restrict the employees' freedom of contract).
43. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
44. Id.; accord Stone v. Goss, 55 A. 736, 738 (N.J. 1903).
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means of acquiring the secret, justify a remedy.45 Copying by inspect-
ing a publicly available product does not violate the duty.
While the Restatement gained substantial adherents, and is proba-
bly still the most influential guide to trade secret definition, its gen-
eral nature allowed uneven development in case law regarding the
parameters of protectible trade secrets and the remedies for their mis-
appropriation.48 In 1968, the American Bar Association established a
committee to develop a uniform act, and in 1979 the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act was approved by the ABA.47 UTSA defines trade secrets
as information that
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gen-
erally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.4 8
The current law thus establishes only a rough balance in defining
trade secrets by providing general guidelines, subject to the ultimate
determination of a fact-finder in all but the most obvious cases (where
the court can determine the result as a matter of law with which no
reasonable person would disagree). The breadth of trade secrets, and
the uncertainties inherent in their definition, whether startlingly
novel or a minor improvement, suggest that there remains a broad
range of situations where the policies supporting and limiting trade
secret protection have substantial impact.
C. The Value of the Trade Secret
In determining whether technology qualifies as a trade secret, the
value of the trade secret is key--and it pays to review this area briefly
because this same issue is key to fashioning the scope of injunctive
relief. How much commercial advantage does the alleged trade secret
provide? This breaks down into two components: How much com-
mercial advantage does the trade secret discovery provide, and over
how much of the competition? A minimal advantage shared by all but
one competitor in a trade of hundreds is not a trade secret. A great
new technology that produces a better widget, or dramatically reduces
the cost of producing widgets, held by one competitor over all others is
undoubtedly a trade secret. Between these extremes, however, deter-
mining how much secrecy is enough, and how much commercial ad-
vantage is enough, remains difficult.
The first issue is how much ingenuity is enough. This inquiry takes
several forms. One is the abiding disagreement about whether the
45. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
46. UTSA Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 434 (1985).
47. Id. at 435-436.
48. UNiF. TRADE SEcRETs Acr § 1(4)(i), (ii)(1985).
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possibility of reverse engineering is sufficient to negate
confidentiality.49
Another is the still viable proposition that trade secrets cannot be
premised on publicly available knowledge, although "new" combina-
tions of publicly available information can be trade secrets.50 While
this principle is not necessarily internally contradictory, the procedure
for determining whether a combination of publicly available informa-
tion is new is not self-explanatory.51
Most courts, however, both older and modern, have tried to deter-
mine how much ingenuity is enough by recognizing trade secrets
where several different entities hold confidential information that
still provides a commercial advantage not generally known in the
industry.5 2
The other issue is how much secrecy is enough. Early cases held
that disclosure within the holder's organization did not undermine
trade secret status where the disclosure was necessary to the commer-
cial utilization of the trade secret, and efforts to control further disclo-
sure were taken.53 Limited disclosure, or independent knowledge of
the secret, outside the holder's organization proved infinitely more
49. Compare SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1255 (3d Cir.
1985) (there is no trade secret where the secret technology is disclosed by reverse
engineering from a product in the public domain) with Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E.
12, 13 (N.Y. 1889)(trade secret may exist even though it is possible with invest-
ment or effort to reverse engineer the secret from a publicly available product);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110 (1892) (same); Richardson v.
Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(same) and UNIF.
TRADE SEcRES AcT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 438-39 (1985)(trade secret exists if re-
verse engineering from publicly available information is lengthy and expensive).
50. Compare Fralich v. Despar, 30 A. 521, 522 (Pa. 1894)(no trade secret can exist
where technology known to many others); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. 370, 373-
74 (1866)(no trade secret for information known by three other businesses) with
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 112 (1892)(new combinations
of publicly available information can be protected as trade secrets) and Hammer
v. Barnes, 26 How. Pr. 174, 176-77 (1863)(trade secret rights existed where holder
sold secret of brewing ales to many others but required confidentiality in each
transaction).
51. Another focus for this inquiry is whether the trade secret must have the novelty
required of a patent. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476, 482
(1974)(patent novelty unnecessary for trade secret protection); Anaconda Co. v.
Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980)(same); A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 1934)(remarking
that discovery is something less than invention); see also notes 43-45 & accompa-
nying text supra.
52. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 526-27 (1837); Hammer v. Barnes, 26 How. Pr. 174,
176-77 (1863); see UNIF. TRADE SECRETs AcT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 438-39 (1985).
53. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452,461 (1868)(necessary disclosure within organiza-
tion); Pressed Steel Car. Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4, 8 (Pa. 1904)(only
reasonable precautions necessary to maintain secrecy regarding railroad car
blueprints-unlocked doors and distribution to customers did not negate
protectibility).
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troublesome.54
This determination of whether a trade secret exists is, almost by
definition, an industry-based determination. An idea that minimally
reduces the costs of production and is known by a large portion of an
industry represents little commercial ingenuity, and prohibiting its
general use exacts significant costs on employees in the profession
who wish to move to a new job or start their own business. On the
other hand, a major new commercial achievement, such as the advent
of zippers to replace buttons, developed by one competitor in the gi-
gantic clothing industry, represents substantial ingenuity and imposes
little constraint on employees' efforts to develop their careers.5 5
While there is no perfect guidance, the policy interests suggest that, to
qualify as a trade secret, technology must meet minimal standards
high enough to justify imposing restraints on employee freedom and
ready marketability of the idea (the latter to protect patent and anti-
trust policies). To determine whether a trade secret exists, the deter-
mination is thus objective, in the sense that a technical edge must exist
over the industry as a whole and not simply over one competitor.
A subjective assessment of a new technology's value will necessar-
ily produce differing results. The goal is to protect the commercial
advantage achieved by the ingenuity, investment, and effort of the in-
ventor. That commercial advantage varies, depending with whom the
inventor's efforts are compared. To more able competitors, a "new"
manufacturing process that reorganizes currently available technol-
ogy is relatively insignificant; they could achieve the same improve-
ment independently with significantly less effort than the "inventor."
To other competitors, the same reorganization of existing technology
is a godsend; some of them simply lack the ingenuity to conceive the
reorganization on their own, and others lack the financial capital or
available human resources to test and perfect the reorganization. The
inventor has achieved an improvement that provides a commercial ad-
vantage over the latter competitors but not the former. The decision
whether the information is generally available within the industry
54. E.g., Deming v. Chapman, 11 How. Pr. 382, 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854)(no protectible
secret could exist because the necessary court review would disclose the secret);
Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. 370, 373-74 (1866) (no secret existed because at least
three other Massachusetts companies knew the technology); Bristol v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 30 N.E. 506 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1892)(submission of
idea to potential employer without agreement to maintain secrecy negated re-
quirement of confidentiality and right to relief); but cf Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4, 6-7 (Pa. 1904)(disclosure of railroad car plans to
customers as requested did not terminate right to protection); Stone v. Goss, 55 A.
736, 738 (N.J. 1903)(in camera proceedings could review trade secrets claim with-
out disclosing secret).
55. See Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener, 172 F.2d 150 (1949).
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will thus necessarily provide too much or too little protection vis-a-vis
a portion of the industry.
The inaccuracy of the objective approach in defining a trade secret
is difficult to correct because of the policy reasons that suggest a cer-
tain minimal standard is necessary throughout each trade to protect
other policy concerns.5 6 Nevertheless, once the court objectively de-
termines that a trade secret exists, the remedy can be adjusted to
match more accurately the commercial value of the misappropriated
trade secret. The next question is how to value what the plaintiff has
lost by the misappropriation. If the misappropriator has disclosed the
trade secret to the entire industry (this is also an objective determina-
tion) one must determine the advantage the secret provided over the
industry as a whole. On the other hand, if the misappropriator has
kept the secret and used it for her own benefit, then the appropriate
determination is how much the trade secret holder has lost to the de-
fendant's benefit. This determination, which is the focus of this arti-
cle, is necessarily subjective; it must focus on the trade secret holder's
loss to the misappropriator and not some abstract conception of the
average competitor.
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR TRADE SECRETS
In balancing competing policy concerns, courts have achieved at
least a rough measure of justice in the decision whether a plaintiff's
technology qualifies as a trade secret. This same balancing, however,
must be performed in determining how much relief to provide to a
successful trade secrets plaintiff, and in this arena neither the com-
mon law nor UTSA has developed a satisfactory and consistent an-
swer. Some courts award punitive injunctions; others attempt to
determine the period of commercial advantage obtained by the misap-
propriator over legitimate competitors.57
A. The History of Equitable Relief for Trade Secrets
The equitable relief granted in the early cases was overwhelmingly
likely to be a perpetual permanent58 injunction prohibiting the use of
56. For example, an advantage held by most of the industry over only a few competi-
tors is unlikely to qualify as a trade secret because such protection would drasti-
cally limit the ability of employees to capitalize on their knowledge of the
technology by bringing it to one of the few.
57. The question of efficiency (at what price justice?) is unavoidable, of course, and it
is fair to ask whether the model for determining the lead-time through court
proceedings imposes unacceptably high transactional costs. This article explains
that the proposed model would add only modest additional costs in legal fees and
judicial resources, if any, over the current model. See text accompanying notes
168-69, infra.
58. For clarity's sake it is important to note that "permanent" injunction in this arti-
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the trade secret information.59 These cases uniformly provide such
sweeping relief without any supporting analysis. This obvious and sig-
nificant restriction on the freedom to trade was apparently justified
simply as a penalty, or perhaps by the difficulty of ensuring that the
misappropriator developed a competing product independently of the
trade secret technology.
By historical accident, the most important engine driving the de-
velopment of models for equitable relief from this early period has
been an unnecessarily vigorous and broad dispute over a particular
subissue: What should a court do about the continuation of equitable
relief after the trade secret ceases to exist? Should a misap-
propriator's conduct require that it continue to be enjoined from using
a trade secret that is now publicly available to every other competitor?
This particular issue became the source of the two most significant,
and contradictory, cases decided this century regarding the length of
trade secret injunctions: Shellmar and Conmar.
The Allen-Qualley Company had developed a process for produc-
ing a particular wrap for candy bars. The Shellmar Products Com-
pany obtained the technology for its exclusive use from Allen-Qualley
but then violated the license by misappropriating the process to its
own advantage, including obtaining a patent for part of the process.
Allen-Qualley obtained a facially perpetual permanent injunction,
prohibiting Shellmar from using the trade secret technology and re-
quiring Shellmar to assign the patent to Allen-Qualley,60 and the first
appellate court opinion in the case affirmed this injunction.61 The
court enjoined Shellmar despite the court's recognition that the trade
secret technology had already been disclosed in a patent obtained by
Shellmar, a machine used by Shellmar, and the "public" practice of a
competitor using the process at its plant, Thomas M. Royal and
Company.6 2
Shellmar later brought a bill of review to dissolve the injunction,
cle signifies the injunction awarded at final judgment, in contrast to a prelimi-
nary injunction issued pending trial. A permanent injunction can last three days.
This term of art has not surprisingly been the cause of some confusion.
59. New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 161 P. 990, 991, 994 (Cal. 1916)(perpetual
injunction); Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 130 P. 1180,1182-83 (Cal. 1913)(per-
petual injunction); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 454 (1868)(unlimited injunc-
tion); O.W. Thum v. Toloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 141-44 (Mich. 1897)(unlimited
injunction); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 115-16 (N.Y.
1892)(unlimited injunction); Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 12-13 (N.Y. 1889)(un-
limited injunction); Champlin v. Stoddart, 30 Hun. 300,302-03 (N.Y. Ch. 1883)(un-
limited injunction); Fralich v. Despar, 30 A. 521, 522 (Pa. 1894)(unlimited
injunction).
60. Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Products Co., 31 F.2d 293 (N.D. IM. 1929).
61. Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929).
62. See Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 105 (7th Cir.
1937) (describing evidence presented at original trial).
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based on three other patents obtained by third parties that disclosed
the process. The trial court refused to dissolve the injunction, and the
appellate court affirmed.63 The courts reasoned that although the full
public disclosure of the trade secret technology through patents termi-
nated the trade secret, Shellmar's inequitable conduct, the violation of
Alllen-Qualley's confidential communication in the license, had taken
Shellmar "outside the pale of the general public to which the disclo-
sure of that patent was made."64
Courts came to read Sheilmar for the proposition that perpetual
injunctions should be granted as a general rule in trade secret cases
and that the termination of a trade secret was irrelevant.6 5
Conmar took a contrary position: If the trade secret was fully dis-
closed by a patent, any injunction must be dissolved at the time of
disclosure, even where the defendant had misappropriated the trade
secret prior to the disclosure.6 6 Employees of Conmar Products Cor-
poration had obtained knowledge of Conmar's process for manufactur-
ing zippers. The employees left Conmar's employ and provided that
knowledge to Universal Slide Fastener, without Universal's knowl-
edge that they were violating a confidence of their former employer.6 7
Conmar had patented various processes related to the zipper and
brought an action against Universal for patent infringement and trade
secret misappropriation. The trial court dismissed several of the pat-
ent claims and the trade secret claim, and the appellate court af-
firmed. The Second Circuit, in an opinion authored by Learned Hand,
reasoned that virtually all of the trade secrets were dedicated by pat-
63. Id. at 110.
64. Id. at 107. For clarity's sake, it is worth noting that in these patent disclosure
cases the rights of the public to the patent information are, of course, limited
during the term of the patent. Thus even where a trade secret injunction is dis-
solved after the issuance of the patent the defendant, and the public generally,
would be subject to suit for infringement by using the technology during the life
of the patent. Shellmar relieves the former trade secret holder, and now patent
holder, from the "burden of suing for patent infringement when its proprietary
rights in the process have already been adjudicated." Id. at 108. Of course, under
the Shellmnar rule the misappropriator remains enjoined even after the patent
has expired.
65. The earlier case of A.0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531
(6th Cir. 1934), is sometimes cited as establishing Shellmrs rule that trade secret
injunctions can extend beyond full disclosure in a patent. See Jager, supra note
26, at § 6.04[1]; Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 108-09
(7th Cir. 1936)(citingA.O. Smith). A close reading of the case discloses, however,
that the AO. Smith court ordered an injunction to last through the patent applica-
tion process, but to be dissolved upon the issuance of any patent covering the
trade secret processes. Unlike Shellmar, then, the owner of the trade secret
would have had to institute a new proceeding that sought continued protection
based on infringement of the patent. A.0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works
Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934).
66. Coumar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener, 172 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir. 1949).
67. Id. at 154.
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ents to the public, and that the employees' obligation to maintain the
trade secrets of their former employer expired upon issuance of the
patents.6 8 Because no obligation requiring secrecy remained, no in-
junction would issue. Conmar expressly rejects Shellmar's suggestion
that earlier "inequitable conduct" prohibits the misappropriator. from
enjoying the rights of the public to the trade secret.6 9
Comar could have reached this result without creating a conflict
with Sheilmar. There were readily available grounds to distinguish
the two cases. In the first place, the defendant in Conmar was an in-
nocent purchaser that did not know it was purchasing a misappropri-
ated trade secret, while the defendant in Shellmar acted in bad faith
by consciously misappropriating the trade secret in violation of its li-
cense agreement. In the second place, in Conmar the trade secret
holder itself had obtained patents that necessarily disclosed the trade
secret. In Shellmar, the trade secret holder had not disclosed the
trade secret to the public. The Second Circuit, nevertheless, chose to
rest its position on the broader policy dispute.
Despite these several possible grounds for distinguishing Sheilmar
and Conmr, within a generation they became the leading cases for
determining the length of trade secret injunctions.70 This occurred
even though both cases addressed full disclosure in patents and did not
purport to create rules applicable to partial disclosure.
In the last two generations, courts have backed away from the two
poles represented by Shellmar and Conmar. Many courts recognized
that both positions overstated the effect of disclosure of the trade se-
cret. Shellmar prevents the misappropriator from ever utilizing the
trade secret, even generations after it ceases to be a trade secret. Con-
mar allows the misappropriator to use the trade secret as soon as it is
publicly available to legitimate competitors, without recognizing the
misappropriator's head start during the period prior to the public dis-
closure when the misappropriator had the use of the trade secret.
These more moderate courts started to fashion an injunctive period
to match the theoretical advantage misappropriators have over an av-
erage competitor. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining &
68. Id. at 156. One trade secret had not been disclosed by patent. With regard to this
trade secret, the Second Circuit affirmed on the ground that Universal was an
innocent purchaser for value-it did not know of the breach of confidence when
it obtained the technology--and its substantial investment prior to notice of the
breach justified its use of that trade secret for the period it remained secret
before it, too, was disclosed by a patent. Id. at 156. This approach follows the
balancing test outlined in the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS for bona fide purchas-
ers of trade secrets. § 758(b) & cmt. (e).
69. Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener, 172 F.2d 150, 155-56 (2d Cir.
1949).
70. See generally Jager, supra note 26, at § 6.04 (citing cases following Shellmar and
Conmar).
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Manufacturing Co.71 is generally recognized as the leading case cham-
pioning this approach. The employees of the Mincom Division of Min-
nesota Mining & Manufacturing took their knowledge of Mincom's
secrets regarding precision tape recording equipment and started a
new business, Winston Research Corporation. Mincom brought suit
and proved that the precision tape recording technology was its trade
secret. The court started from the proposition that Mincom was enti-
tled to protection of its trade secrets for as long as they remained se-
cret.7 2  Mffincom, however, publicly disclosed its trade secret
technology during the prosecution of the lawsuit in "public announce-
ments, demonstrations, and sales and deliveries" of its Mincom ma-
chines.7 3 The trial court refused to apply either of the extreme rules
of Shellmar (perpetual injunction) or Conmar (no injunction), and
ruled instead that Winston should be enjoined for a period of two
years. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the balancing of pol-
icies, employee freedom versus rewarding the employer's initiative
and investment,74 required an injunction for "the approximate period
it would require a legitimate Mincom competitor to develop a success-
ful machine after public disclosure of the secret information."75 This
lead-time approach has been followed in many, if not the majority of,
jurisdictions throughout the country.7 6
The Winston Research lead-time approach has superficial attrac-
tiveness, at least in comparison to the extreme positions of Shellmar
and Conmar. It constructs a remedy presumably designed to impose
upon the misappropriator the same time restraint borne by legitimate
competitors. The lead-time cases assume, however, without discussion
or with only conclusory assertions, that a trade secret can be reverse
engineered and that the only issue is how long the process will take.
Given that the lead-time cases grow out of the Winston Research!
Shellmar/Conmar dispute, in which the trade secrets had already
been publicly disclosed, this is understandable. It is, however, an illog-
ical assumption. The logical first question, which has been regularly
downplayed when it has not been totally ignored, is whether the de-
fendant could have replicated the technology without the trade
71. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
72. Id. at 141.
73. Id. at 141.
74. Id. at 137-38.
75. Id. at 142.
76. E.g., Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir.
1991)(applying Oregon law); Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 828 F.2d 452,
456 (8th Cir. 1987)(applying Minnesota and California law); Viscofan, S.A. v. U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm., 787 F.2d 544, 547, 549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(applying federal
common law); Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 374-75 (8th Cir.
1986)(applying Missouri law); Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423,
1435-37 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(applying Illinois law); K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506
F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974)(applying Washington and Maryland law).
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secret.77
Moreover, many cases either expressly apply an objective standard
to determine the lead-time period, or contain contradictory language
and analysis, some objective and some subjective.78 This allows a mis-
appropriator the benefit (or imposes the penalty) of being treated as a
mythical average competitor, rather than looking subjectively at what
the misappropriator would have accomplished by legitimate means.
This objective lead-time approach fails to provide an accurate compen-
satory remedy.
B. The Compensatory/Punitive Dispute is Alive and Well
The initial focus of Shellmar and Conmar on whether the remedy
should have a punitive component has, not surprisingly, produced case
law focused primarily on this dispute. The battle continues in full
spate; both positions are championed by considerable adherents. De-
spite the fast-paced growth of the lead-time analysis, many common
law jurisdictions either regularly or occasionally still impose facially
perpetual punitive injunctions.79
UTSA apparently intended to resolve this dispute. It authorizes
injunctions for the life of the trade secret and for any lead-time period
thereafter necessary to eliminate commercial advantage that other-
77. E.g., UNiF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 449-51 (1985)(focusing on abili-
ties of competitors with no reference to the misappropriator's capabilities); Schu-
lenberg v. Signatrol, 212 N.E.2d 865, 869-70 (Il. 1965)(same).
78. See notes 86-87 & accompanying text infra.
79. William IM. Mercer, Inc. v. Maclean Assoc., Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1806 (E.D. Pa.
1991)(Pennsylvania law); Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Digital Transac-
tions, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1990)(applying New York law and ordering
perpetual injunction prohibiting sale of existing products built through misappro-
priation and six-month injunction against use of trade secret); Molex, Inc. v. No-
len, 759 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1985)(Texas law, perpetual injunction); Zoecon
Indus., Inc. v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1180 (5th Cir.
1983)(Texas law); Elnicky Enterprises, Inc. v. Spotlight Present, Inc., 213
U.S.P.Q. 855, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)(New York law); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-
Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319,326 & n.8 (Mass. 1980)(Massachusetts law);
David Fox & Sons, Inc. v. King Poultry Co., 47 Misc. 672, 262 N.Y.S.2d 983
(1984)(New York law); Valco Cincinnati v. N & D Machining Serv., 492 N.E.2d
814, 820 (Ohio 1986)(Ohio common law); Pyromatics, Inc. v. Petruziello, 454
N.E.2d 588, 595 (Ohio 1983); Williams v. Compressor Eng'g Corp., 704 S.W.2d 469
(Tex. App. 1986); Elcor Chemical Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 213
(Texas 1973)(applying Texas law); cf Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868
F.2d 1226,1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(apparently applying California common law, pos-
sibly later altered by California's passage of UTSA); American Precision Vibrator
Co. v. Nat'l Air Vibrator Co., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129 (Tex. App. 1989)(approving per-
petual injunction but vacating relief to extent it exceeded that requested in the
pleadings); Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223,228 (5th Cir. 1968)(ap-
plying Florida law, possibly altered by Florida's passage of UTSA); Saunders v.
Florence Enameling Co., 540 So. 2d 651, 655 (Ala. 1988)(applying Alabama com-
mon law, possibly later altered by Alabama's passage of UTSA).
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wise would be derived from the misappropriation.8 0 The Commission-
ers' Comments to the section expressly decry punitive perpetual
injunctions and propose setting injunctions by the time necessary for
good faith competitors to replicate the trade secret legitimately, citing
a lead-time case.81 Despite the comment's language, some courts have
interpreted UTSA as supporting indefinite, and often apparently per-
petual or punitive, injunctions.82 Others have set definite periods us-
80. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2 (1985). The current language of the section, in
effect since 1985, provides:
2. Injunctive Relief
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon applica-
tion to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret
has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional
reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that
otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.
(b) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use
upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time
for which use could have been prohibited. Exceptional circumstances in-
clude, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position
prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that
renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret
may be compelled by court order.
This article focuses on the proper interpretation of subsection (a). Subsection (b)
reaches rare situations where public needs or peculiar equities require considera-
tion of a royalty alternative. Such a required royalty might make sense, for ex-
ample, where national security requires immediate fulfillment of a contract and
the trade secret holder is unable timely to provide the necessary equipment, or
where a misappropriator is a veterinarian and has already started a course of
treatment on particular animals using the misappropriated product. Cf Yovatt v.
Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425, 426 (1820)(granting injunction but excepting
medicines used to finish course of treatment under progress).
81. 14 U.L.A. 449-51 § 2 cmt. (citing K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir.
1974)).
82. United Centrifugal Pumps, Inc. v. Cusimano, 708 F. Supp. 1038, 9 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1171,1181 (W.D. Ark. 1988)(facially perpetual injunction under Arkansas UTSA);
Aries Information Systems, Inc. v. Pacific Management Systems Corp., 226
U.S.P.Q. 440, 443 (Minn. App. 1985)(permanent injunctive relief); Boeing Co. v.
Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 681-82 (Wash. 1987)(granting relief under Washing-
ton UTSA for the life of the trade secret without regard to the defendant's ability
to reverse engineer in later years); cf Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting &
Pkg., Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1565, 1569 (Va. 1990)(indefinite injunction until enjoined
party establishes that trade secret has ceased and additional lead-time expired);
Wolfe v. Tuthill Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1988)(remanding for trial court to
determine whether to issue indefinite or definite injunction); Centorr Assoc. v.
Tokyo Tokushu Necco, Ltd., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13897 (granting apparently per-
petual and punitive relief as remedy after damages hearing upon default, without
analysis). This curious reliance on UTSA for facially unlimited injunctions is
perhaps based on the singularly unhelpful statement in the Commissioners' Com-
ments that UTSA intended to codify the "results of the better-reasoned cases
concerning the remedies for trade secret misappropriation," without describing
or listing those cases. UTSA Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 435
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ing the lead-time analysis.8 3
The persistence of the dispute between punitive and lead-time in-
junctive remedies under both UTSA and the common law is, this arti-
cle suggests, not only the result of different policy decisions but also a
result of the frustration, not always conscious, with the inaccurate
compensation often produced by the lead-time remedy, and a concomi-
tant willingness to reach for support to whichever line of authority
supports the result the court considers just under the circumstances.
IV. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE CURRENT
COMPENSATORY MODEL
Quiescent in the shadow of the punitive/compensatory dispute, the
model for determining the appropriate compensatory injunctive relief
has remained rudimentary, amorphous, and unpredictable. Should
the test for compensatory relief be objective or subjective? How
should courts calculate the period of injunctive relief? What impact
should bad faith misappropriation have? HoW should the non-time in-
vestments necessary to develop a trade secret affect injunctive and
monetary relief? Neither UTSA nor common law jurisdictions have
resolved these issues.
Several commentators have addressed aspects of trade secret in-
junctions, and many have provided useful suggestions, but none has
pointed out that a subjective test provides a workable model for calcu-
lating the injunctive period based on the date the misappropriator
would have commenced legitimate replication. Nor has any commen-
tator advised drawing an inference from bad faith misappropriation in
developing a compensatory injunctive remedy.8 4
(1985); see Wolfe v. Tuthill Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1988)(reasoning that UTSA
codifies the common law).
83. E.g., Lamb-Weston v. McCain Foods, 941 F.2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1991); Surgidev
Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 456-57 (8th Cir. 1987).
84. E.g., M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw chs. 6-7 (1992 Revision)(canvassing cases and
interpreting UTSA to set a compromise between Shelimar and Conmar); L. Sam-
uels & B. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The States' Response, 24
CREIGHTON L. REV. 49 (1990)(canvassing legislative enactments of, and amend-
ments to, UTSA); Comment, Trade Secret Misappropriation: What is the Proper
Length of An Injunction After Public Disclosure?, 51 ALBANY L. REv. 271
(1987)(favoring lead-time analysis where there is no bad faith and punitive in-
junctions where the misappropriation is particularly egregious); M. Barclay,
Comment, Trade Secrets. How Long Should an Injunction Last?, 26 UCLA L.
REv. 203 (1978)(proposing an objective analysis). Courts and commentators have
sporadically mentioned the non-time investment component of damages but have
seldom recognized the interdependence of non-time investments with the calcu-
lation of the period of injunctive relief. E.g., M. Barclay, supra, at 219 n.70. The
few decisions paying some attention to non-time investments, and especially
those assessing their relationship to injunctive relief, are a welcome sight, but
they often still provide an incomplete remedy and remain a rare exception. A.L.
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This section describes the specific problems under current law with
these particular aspects of compensatory relief and establishes the
need for a better model that accurately compensates the trade secret
holder.
A. The Flaws in an Objective, Abstract Approach
Today, courts still generally fail to address whether the standard
Laboratories v. Philips Roxane, 803 F.2d 378, 383 (8th Cir. 1986)(affirming trial
court's reduction of non-time investment monetary damages on the ground that
the defendant had not used the trade secret research and had instead purchased
the same information later from another source); Syntex Ophthalmics v.
Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(reversing trial court's award of a
twenty-year injunction where evidence included the equivalent of twenty years
of labor invested by many people over two chronological years and an expendi-
ture of one million dollars, but not awarding any monetary component of non-
time damages); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410,419 (E.D.
Pa. 1980)(estimating investments necessary for reverse engineering to be one
year and $100,000); Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, 325 F. Supp. 1209,
1216,1219 (E.D. Va. 1970)(awarding monetary compensation for non-time invest-
ments), rev'd, 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (4th Cir. 1971)(wrongfully concluding that
the award for non-time investments represented a double recovery of the amount
awarded for the plaintiff's lost profit); Schulenburg v. Signatrol Inc., 212 N.E.2d
865, 869 (Ill. 1965)(recognizing that reverse engineering would require time and
expense but not including the expense in its analysis); Analogic Corp. v. Data
Translation, 358 N.E.2d 804, 808 (Mass. 1976)(noting in remanding case for recon-
sideration of injunctive relief that the misappropriator's avoidance of the "normal
costs of invention and duplication" might justify a monetary payment as a condi-
tion precedent to concluding injunctive relief).
Many other commentators have advanced models to reflect the competing in-
terests between employers in protecting their trade secrets and employees in
freely marketing their personal skills and general knowledge of the trade. B.
Kugler, Limiting Trade Secret Protection, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 725 (1988)(propos-
ing that trade secrets be divided into "quasi-patent" secrets of substantial novelty
and lesser trade secrets, and allowing implied notice by the employer to bind the
employee only for the quasi-patent secrets learned or developed during employ-
ment); Spanner, Trade Secrets Versus Technological Innovation, 87 TECH. REV. 12
(1984); Note, A Balanced Approach to Employer-Employee Trade Secret Disputes
in California, 31 HASTNGs L.J. 671 (1980); Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in
the Employer-Employee Relationship, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 200 (1964); Note;
Trade Secrets, Customer Contacts, and the Employer-Employee Relationship, 37
IND. L.J. 218 (1962); Comment, Trade Secret Developed by Employee in the Course
of Authorized Research May be Used in Competing with Former Employer, 74
HARv. L. REv. 1473 (1961). This article does not concentrate directly on this ten-
sion. Nevertheless, I believe this article's proposed model distinguishing the
treatment of bad faith and good faith misappropriators adequately protects em-
ployees who attempt to further their careers in good faith, while appropriately
setting a higher standard of proof for bad faith misappropriators. See notes 154-59
& accompanying text infa (proposing that bad faith should raise a rebuttable
presumption of inability to replicate legitimately). Moreover, the model's use of a
subjective standard rather than an objective standard allows employees with high
degrees of capability to prove that legitimate replication would have been
achieved in a shorter period than average.
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for calculating injunctive relief should be objective or subjective.8s
Many opinions have language at one point suggesting one approach
and language another place suggesting the other.86 In the absence of
clear guidance, courts generally appear to have applied an objective
standard, although the approach is often unclear.8 7 Even those cases
that appear to claim a subjective approach seldom ask the question a
subjective standard requires: Could have and would have the misap-
propriator legitimately replicated the trade secret technology absent
the misappropriation?
UTSA was meant to provide a better-reasoned approach but in fact
exacerbates the problem. The Commissioners' Comment to the in-
junctive provision states that the test should be developed in light of
the abilities of "good faith competitors," not in light of the defendant's
abilities. 8S This pressure for an objective injunction contradicts the
act's express language, which authorizes injunctive relief for the life of
the trade secret plus any lead-time injunction necessary to eliminate
the commercial advantage gained from the misappropriation.89 This
express, albeit general, language is apt to be overborne by the com-
ment's specific encouragement to set the injunction by the efforts of
good faith competitors-especially in light of the statute's use of the
permissive "may" to describe the maximum injunction.
The objective approach fails to appreciate the significant differ-
ences created by the different capabilities and resources of different
competitors and thus invites miscalculations of the appropriate injunc-
tive period. The courts most often ask how long some "average" com-
petitor would take to develop the trade secret technology and fail to
determine whether that is the time the misappropriator would have
taken to develop the technology legitimately without the misappropri-
85. E.g., Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die, 485 F. Supp. 410, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207-08 (111. 1980); K-2
Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974).
86. Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1991);
Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1986); Viscofan, S.A.
v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., 787 F.2d 544, 547, 549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1986); American
Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314,334 n.24 (7th Cir. 1984); Syntex Ophthalmics
v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423, 1435-37 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Elec-
tronic Concepts, 325 F. Supp. 1209, 1216, 1219 (E.D. Va. 1970).
87. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 456 (8th Cir. 1987); Ameri-
can Paper & Packaging Products v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1326 (1986);
Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (IlM. 1980); Ana-
logic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804,807-08 (Mass. 1976); Northern
Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 1973); Winston
Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141-42 (9th Cir.
1965); Plant Indus. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Schulen-
burg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865, 869-70 (Ill. 1965).
88. UNwF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 450 (1985).
89. See note 80 aupra.
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ated information.90 But not all competitors are equally placed to du-
plicate the trade secret information. Legitimately replicating the
trade secret technology requires ingenuity, labor, financial resources,
and often various other investments such as specialized equipment.
The objective approach thus undercompensates the trade secret
holder if the misappropriator has less of the necessary resources than
the legitimate competitors or the "average" competitor, and it
overcompensates if the misappropriator has greater resources.
The commentators have fallen into the same error.91 Barclay's
model, for example, asserts that the true period of commercial advan-
tage is the period after public disclosure from the time the defendant
reaches the market until a legitimate replicator reaches the market.
This approach fails to recognize that the period of commercial advan-
tage obtained through misappropriation is the period from the date
the misappropriator reached the market using the trade secret until
the date the misappropriator, and not an arbitrary legitimate competi-
tor, would have reached the market through legitimate means.
In addition to producing miscalculations of the injunctive period,
the objective approach has also encouraged too ready assumptions that
misappropriators have the ability to replicate the trade secret legiti-
mately. The objective approach's easy encouragement of broad, casual
characterizations, and the concentration of the Shellmar and Conmar
cases on postdisclosure cases, have led courts calculating periods of in-
junctive relief to assume, with little or no proof, that the misap-
propriator could have replicated the trade secret technology absent
the misappropriation.
Shellmar and Conmar produced general rules the courts applied to
all situations where any trade secret information was available to the
public-without distinguishing between a patent that discloses the en-
tire trade secret, the sale of a product that allows little or no reverse
engineering potential, the sale of a product providing relatively simple
reverse engineering, and the press release that provides bits of infor-
mation. Where the trade secret has been fully disclosed to the public,
usually by a patent, the trade secret terminates and creates the precise
issue addressed in Shellmar and Conmar. This full disclosure is a pub-
lic dedication of the trade secret. Relief fashioned in this situation can
start from the unquestioned proposition that now no trade secret
exists. 92
90. See notes 76-77 & accompanying text supra.
91. See, eg., Barclay, supra note 12, at 219.
92. Of course, the misappropriator may not be able to invest the resources necessary
for a good faith competitor to take advantage of the trade secret information,
even after it becomes public. In this instance the misappropriator should still be
enjoined from using the trade secret information until it attains the resources a
good faith competitor would require. See text accompanying notes 112-14 infra.
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Where the trade secret holder has not disclosed the entire secret,
however, such as the sale of a product that incorporates the trade se-
cret technology, fashioning appropriate injunctive relief is substan-
tially more difficult, and the Shellmar and Conmar approaches
oversimplify this task. An example of public dedication of a trade se-
cret would be handing someone the formula for Coca-Cola. This is
dramatically different from selling Coca-Cola to the public, recogniz-
ing that anyone is free to try to figure out how to copy it. No one has
done so. 93
The objective, abstract approach thus assumes without proof that
the nisappropriator could step into the shoes of a legitimate competi-
tor and reverse engineer the trade secret, or even step into the shoes
of the trade secret inventor and independently develop the trade se-
cret.94 This may provide the misappropriator a technology it could
never have achieved legitimately.
Courts concerned to avoid undercompensation may proceed too far
in the opposite direction.95 In order to deprive the misappropriator of
the commercial advantage achieved by the misappropriation in this
setting, one must ask a question unnecessary where the trade secret
has been dedicated to the public: Could the misappropriator have re-
verse engineered or independently developed the trade secret technol-
ogy absent the misappropriation? The more novel, sophisticated, and
creative the technology, the more unlikely that the misappropriator
could have legitimately recreated it. The lead-time approach, led by
Winston Research, fails to ask this question.
93. E. KAHN, THE BIG DumK: THE STORY OF COCA-COLA, 103-04 (1960)(no successful
replication of formula for Coca-Cola); see also Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738
P.2d 665, 681-82 (Wash. 1987)(affirming indefinite injunction where no evidence
of legitimate replication existed although airplane cockpit window had been in
use several years); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407
N.E.2d 319, 326 (Mass. 1980)(despite sale and use for more than forty years no
competitor had legitimately replicated Curtiss-Wright's airplane engine piston).
94. E.g., Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865, 869-70 (IM1. 1965)(implying
that length of injunction should follow the time taken by a Minnesota company
that legitimately replicated the trade secrets); Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris, 794
F.2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1986); Nat'l Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 43(Mo. 1966); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d
134, 142 (9th Cir. 1965)("approximate period" a "legitimate competitor" would
require to develop the trade secret technology); Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics
Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 27, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1974)(ordering injunction to extend until third
party legitimately replicates the trade secret technology, without any considera-
tion of defendant's abilities).
95. E.g., Centorr Assoc. v. Tokyo Tokushu Necco, Ltd., 1991 LEXIS 13897 (granting
indefinite injunction as remedy after default, without discussion of appropriate
length, despite California's passage of UTSA); Saunders v. Florence Enameling
Co., 540 So. 2d 651, 655 (Ala. 1988)(granting indefinite relief and prohibiting de-
fendant from independent replication); Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Mgmt. Sys.
Corp., 226 U.S.P.Q. 440, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)(granting indefinite relief).
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The failure to highlight the distinction between termination of the
trade secret by full public disclosure, and the sale of a product incorpo-
rating it, has thus unduly minimized the importance of asking first
whether the misappropriator could legitimately develop the trade se-
cret technology, and then whether the misappropriator would have
taken the same amount of time for legitimate replication as other
competitors. This erroneously encourages definitive injunctions even
where there is no or little evidence that the defendant could in the
given period reverse engineer the trade secret technology by legiti-
mate means.
B. Calculating the Length of the Injunction
The preceding discussion addressing objective or subjective injunc-
tions focused on the test to determine when an injunction should end:
The courts determine when the average competitor reached the mar-
ket, rather than the time the misappropriator would have itself
reached the market absent the misappropriation.96 This subsection fo-
cuses on the problems courts face in selecting the proper date to use
for calculating the commencement of the injunctive period.
In an ideal setting, of course, the injunction would start as soon as
the misappropriation occurred, prevent any use or disclosure, and con-
tinue until the misappropriator would have legitimately replicated the
trade secret without the aid of the misappropriation. In practice, how-
ever, the trade secret holder must learn of the misappropriation, at-
tempt commercial redress if feasible and desirable, and then file a
lawsuit. After this, the trade secret holder's best result is a temporary
restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction.97 If this is un-
successful, the trade secret holder will have to wait for equitable relief
until final judgment, or perhaps even an appellate decision.
As a practical matter, then, the actual injunction will commence
only at the arbitrary time when a preliminary or permanent injunc-
tion is granted.98 The actual injunction will thus commence after the
ideal injunction would have begun, and may not commence (depend-
ing on the length of time required to discover the misappropriation
and prosecute the trade secrets action) until after the ideal injunction
would have concluded. How should the court determine the length of
the actual injunction?
To place the misappropriator and trade secret holder in the posi-
tions they would have occupied absent the misappropriation, the best
the court can do is to hold the misappropriator out of the market for
96. See notes 76-77, 90 and accompanying text supra (courts' generally objective
approach).
97. See notes 151-53 & accompanying text infra.
98. See note 100 & accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 72:515
TRADE SECRET INJUNCTIONS
the same period of time it gained by the misappropriation. The court
can enjoin the misappropriator for the correct length of time, but the
commencement and expiration dates of the injunction will be later
than they would have been under the ideal injunction.99
Courts have calculated the injunctive time period from several dif-
ferent dates, including the date of the misappropriation, the date of
public disclosure of the trade secret, the date a preliminary injunction
was first entered, and the date of final judgment issuing the perma-
nent injunction.100
The courts calculating the period of the actual injunction from the
date of misappropriation have seldom offered any rationale for this
approach.03 Perhaps it is an outgrowth of the understanding that an
ideal injunction would have started on this date. If one misappropri-
ates a trade secret, one should have to wait to use it until one would
have obtained it legitimately. There are, nevertheless, several flaws
with this simplistic approach.
First, in the real world a misappropriator obtains the benefit of the
trade secret from the date of the misappropriation until a court en-
joins its use. Commencing the injunctive period from the date of the
99. See, ag., Premier Indus. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Fastener Corp., 450 F.2d 444, 448
(5th Cir. 1971)(holding that equitable relief enforcing a two-year noncompetition
agreement could endure longer than two years after the employee left the firm to
remedy the period during which the employee violated the agreement).
100. E.g., Lamb-Weston v. McCain Foods, 941 F.2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1991)(calculat-
ing from date of preliminary injunction and from date of misappropriation, not-
ing that in that instance both produced roughly the same results); Integrated
Cash Mgmt. Servs. v. Digital Transactions, 920 F.2d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 1990)(date of
preliminary injunction); A.L. Laboratories, Inc. v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d
378, 385 (9th Cir. 1986)(date of misappropriation); Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v.
Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(holding that injunction should run
eight years from misappropriation or four years from preliminary injunction); K-
2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1974)(remanding to trial
court to determine whether injunctive period should be calculated from date of
preliminary or permanent injunction); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134,143 (9th Cir. 1965)(date of final judgment, noting
for support that this date was close to the date of public disclosure of the trade
secret); Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, 325 F. Supp. 1209, 1219-20
(E.D. Va. 1970)(date of final judgment); Plant Indus. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636,
645 (C.D. Cal. 1968)(date of memorandum opinion after trial); Brunswick Corp. v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (IlM. 1980)(date of final judgment);
Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. v. Wolf, 112 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1961)(date of prelimi-
nary injunction); see Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057,
1059-61 (7th Cir. 1973)(affirming denial of preliminary injunction sought for a
1965 misappropriation on the ground that the period necessary for legitimate rep-
lication had expired before plaintiff sought preliminary injunction).
101. E.g., Lamb-Weston v. McCain Foods, 941 F.2d 970,975 (9th Cir. 1991); but see A.L.
Laboratories, Inc. v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 385 (9th Cir. 1986)(cor-
rectly recognizing that the date of misappropriation is not conclusive, but is the
correct date only if the misappropriator would have commenced legitimate repli-
cation on that date absent the misappropriation).
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misappropriation effectively deducts this period-even though the
misappropriator has been using the trade secret technology all along.
Those who calculate the period from the date of misappropriation
are effectively making two blanket assumptions that are often errone-
ous. First, they assume that the misappropriator could have legiti-
mately obtained the product to reverse engineer (or could have
otherwise commenced legitimate replication) on the date of misappro-
priation. Second, they assume that the misappropriator would have
started legitimate replication efforts on that date if they had not had
the opportunity to misappropriate.
If the product was not available for legitimate reverse engineering
on the date of the misappropriation, for example, calculating the in-
junctive period from that date provides the misappropriator a head
start over legitimate competitors for the period between the misappro-
priation and the date of public availability of products for reverse
engineering.
Even if the product were available on the date of the misappropria-
tion, the misappropriator might not have started legitimate replication
on that date. It may have been only the opportunity to misappropriate
that led to the decision to develop a product to match the trade secret
holder's. In these cases, calculating the period from the date of misap-
propriation rewards the misappropriator with an assured entry into
the market, with no reverse engineering risks, after a waiting period
that starts before the misappropriator would have in fact started any
legitimate replication efforts. Unless the misappropriator can estab-
lish both the intent and the ability to replicate absent the misappropri-
ation, there is no justification for calculating the period from the date
of misappropriation.102
C. Bad Faith Misappropriators
Third, the cases fail to recognize, at least expressly, that the bad
faith of a misappropriator does have a rational impact on the fashion-
ing of compensatory relief. If the bad faith misappropriator could
have legitimately replicated the trade secret technology at all, or with
a commercially viable level of investment, it is less likely that the mis-
appropriator would have chosen to risk the possible litigation created
by the misappropriation. It is therefore reasonable to infer, absent
contrary evidence, that the misappropriator could not have reverse en-
102. Innocent misappropriators are likely to be able to prove that they were engaged
in, or already planning, legitimate replication efforts at the time of the misappro-
priation. Their corporate planning structure, board meetings, and research and
development efforts may all evince plans for legitimate replication. Bad faith
replicators, on the other hand, may well have simply capitalized on the opportu-
nity to misappropriate. In this instance an indefinite injunction requiring legiti-
mate replication is appropriate. See notes 154-59 & accompanying text imifra.
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gineered the trade secret, at least at the same level of investment as
the trade secret holder.
D. Non-time Investments
Fourth, current lead-time analysis generally ignores the other vari-
ables in research and development that could affect the amount of
time necessary to develop the trade secret information. 03 Even
where the courts recognize that labor, capital, and other resources not
measured (or only partially measured) by time are necessary to create
a trade secret, the courts have not developed a uniform model for eval-
uating the impact of those investments on trade secret remedies and
their interdependence with the time necessary for legitimate
replication.
V. FACIALLY UNLIMITED INJUNCTIONS FACE SIMILAR
PROBLEMS
There are courts, of course, that attempt to avoid the lead-time
analysis by issuing injunctions that are apparently perpetual in length,
often justifying the relief on punitive grounds. Indefinite injunctions
have been issued both when the trade secret has been fully disclosed
and when only limited information has been made available to the
public.104
Very few of these injunctions, however, are truly perpetual, and
their indefinite character merely puts off the question of appropriate
standards for their termination.105 Opinions often note the possibility
that the court can change the terms of the injunction upon application
but do not describe the showing that would be required.o6
Indefinite injunctions also require a model to determine the appro-
priate time for their termination. Avoiding this issue in facially un-
limited injunctions risks their becoming perpetual in fact, whether or
103. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205 (111. 1980); Win-
ston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965);
Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973); Sigma
Chemical Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1986).
104. See notes 79, 82 & accompanying text supra.
105. But see Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri Sul, 494 S.W.2d 204, 212-13 (Tex. Ct. App.
1973) (expressly perpetual).
106. E.g., Wolfe v. Tuthill Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1988); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319,326 (Mass. 1980); cf. Analogic Corp. v.
Data Translation, 358 N.E.2d 804, 807-08 (Mass. 1976)(describing several vague
and general factors for the trial court to consider when crafting injunctive relief);
Boeing Co. v. Sierracin, 738 P.2d 665, 682 (Wash. 1987)(noting Washington statu-
tory authority providing for termination of injunction only when trade secret
ceases); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1974)(affirming
injunction designed to terminate when trade secret ceases).
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not that was intended.107 Courts that revisit and terminate such in-
junctions without any guidance will produce unpredictable and incon-
sistent results. Where the injunction should compensate, no model is
provided to determine the appropriate length. Even where the injunc-
tion is designed to punish, no guidance tells the court how much is
enough.
Courts determining injunctive relief are thus faced with case law
and statutory precedent that offer inadequate alternatives for injunc-
tive relief: An objective lead-time injunction that may not match the
commercial advantage gained by the misappropriator, and an indefi-
nite injunction without guidance as to whether or when it should
terminate.
Many courts those affirming lead-time and facially unlimited in-
junctions also afford the trial court broad discretion under the totality
of the circumstances in each case.108 This approach provides little gui-
dance and produces arbitrary injunctions.
The continued support for punitive injunctions, even when the
common law and UTSA authorize punitive damages and punitive
awards of attorney's fees, may in part reflect an unarticulated judicial
conviction that lead-time remedies as historically fashioned are insuf-
ficient to erase the commercial advantage gained by the misap-
propriator. A review of the cases suggests that indefinite injunctions
are often granted in a situation where the misappropriator could not
establish under a subjective test that it could have legitimately devel-
107. E.g., Centorr Assoc. v. Tokyo Tokushu Necco, Ltd., 1991 LEXIS 13897. It also
risks arbitrary results and straightforward error. E.g., Greenberg v. Croydon
Plastics Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 27,28 (E.D. Pa. 1974)(ordering injunction to extend un-
til third party legitimately replicates the trade secret technology, without any
consideration of defendant's abilities or actions).
108. Boeing Co. v. Sierracin, 738 P.2d 665, 675, 681-82 (Wash. 1987); Saunders v. Flo-
rence Enameling Co., 540 So. 2d 651, 655 (Ala. 1988)(prohibits independent devel-
opment by defendant and no guidelines for termination); Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 806 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(no guidelines, an "appropriate"
injunction); Wolfe v. Tuthill Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1988)(express power to
revisit but no guidelines); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co.,
407 N.E.2d 319, 326 (Mass. 1980)(no guidelines beyond "substantial change in cir-
cumstances"); Valco Cincinnati Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv. Inc., 492 N.E.2d
814, 820 (Ohio 1986); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 419 A.2d 1115, 1119 (N.H. 1980);
Eastern Marble Prod. Corp. v. Roman Marble Inc., 364 N.E.2d 799, 803-04 (Mass.
1977)(noting broad discretion under Massachusetts common law while reversing
and remanding to determine whether trade secret still exists and indefinite per-
manent injunction remains in order); Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d
223, 227 (5th Cir. 1968); cf Viscofan, S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm., 787
F.2d 544, 548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reciting trial court's broad discretion in affirming
ten-year Federal Trade Commission's trade secrets injunction prohibiting im-
ports); Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, 358 N.E.2d 804, 807-08 (Mass.
1976)(revisiting the issue of injunctive relief upon the enjoined party's claim of
changed circumstances, and holding that a lead-time injunction is the minimum
relief, but bad faith could justify greater relief).
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oped the trade secret technology.109 One can only speculate, of course,
about whether these cases would have had different outcomes had the
courts been invited to apply a subjective test to determine the length
of the injunction.
In similar fashion, the support for wide trial court discretion may
reflect an unwarranted perception that more helpful guidelines for
determining commercial advantage are unavailable. The cases may
also reflect an undeclared, and currently unexpressed, recognition
that bad faith does have a legitimate impact on the analysis of the pe-
riod necessary to provide compensatory relief.
VI. THE SOLUTION
With this review of the deficiencies of the objective lead-time in-
junction, the compensatory model for an appropriate remedy is
straightforward-a subjective lead-time injunction based on the dates
the misappropriator would have commenced and concluded legitimate
replication. In considering the ability of the misappropriator to re-
verse engineer a trade secret, the court should infer, absent contrary
evidence, that bad faith evidences an inability to replicate the trade
secret legitimately. The damages should also include compensation
that reflects non-time investments.
This model will make the plaintiff whole by ensuring that the
plaintiff maintains the commercial advantage she achieved in develop-
ing the trade secret. Moreover, this improvement will not exact sig-
nificantly greater judicial or legal costs than are currently borne
under the objective lead-time model. Finally, both UTSA and the
common law authorize, and in fact invite, this improvement.
A. The Subjective Test
All trade secret injunctions should share some basic characteris-
tics. In the absence of the trade secret's demise, injunctions should, of
course, always prohibit the defendant from disclosing the trade secret.
In addition, injunctions should cease after termination of the trade se-
cret and any additional period necessary to eliminate the misap-
propriator's commercial advantage over legitimate replicators.110 On
the other hand, injunctions should never prohibit the defendant from
attempting to reproduce the benefit of the trade secret by all permissi-
ble means, including reverse engineering."11
109. E.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin, 738 P.2d 655, 681.82 (Wash. 1987); Valco Cincinnati,
Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Ohio 1986); Aerosonic
Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 1988).
110. This standard is promulgated expressly by UNIF. TRADE SEcRETS AcT § 2, 14
U.L.A. 449 (1985); see note 80 supra.
111. All permissible means include any approach that does not use the misappropri-
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The court should ask whether and when the particular misap-
propriator, and not some third party or the trade secret holder, could
and would have legitimately replicated the trade secret at issue.
There is no reason to assume that the trade secret holder or legitimate
replicators developed the technology from the same starting points as
the misappropriator. Was the misappropriator in a position to invest
the same number of people in the effort, or people of the same capabil-
ities, or the same laboratory or factory equipment, or the same amount
of financial resources?112
Many misappropriators either never could have developed the
technology legitimately or would have taken a different period of
time, or different level of resources, than the legitimate replicator.
The misappropriator may well have chosen to misappropriate because
it failed to develop the technology legitimately, or never hoped to de-
velop the technology legitimately. A misappropriator new to the in-
dustry may misappropriate the technology to leapfrog to the front of
the industry, gaining the basic industrial knowledge as well as the
trade secret technology. The misappropriator may be a start-up or a
small company without the capital to develop the technology." 3 As-
suming that these misappropriators can amass the "average" resources
available in the industry often undervalues the commercial advantage
they secured.
On the other hand, the legitimate replication period will also often
be shorter than the original trade secret holder's development period
and may even be shorter than the period taken by earlier replicators.
ated information. In practical terms, this will require the misappropriator to
"subcontract" the effort to individuals or entities who are not tainted by the mis-
appropriated information. Anyone who has been exposed to the misappropriated
information cannot help but use that information. E.g., Winston Research Corp.
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 144 (9th Cir. 1965); Stone v. Goss,
55 A. 736, 738 (N.J. 1903). In the same manner, any equipment, literature or ma-
terial produced with the benefit of the misappropriated information is tainted. Of
course, the misappropriator will have to recognize that the propriety of this sub-
contracting effort will be rigorously tested should it be successful, and will have
to keep engineering or laboratory notebooks, financial records, labor records, and
other regularly kept business entries of the investments incurred in the reverse
engineering process. E.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., slip op. at 3 (Wash. Sup.
Ct., Case No. 84-2-11826-1, July 31, 1985)(providing misappropriator an opportu-
nity to prove it could develop the trade secret technology without using the trade
secret), supersedeas bond denied Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., slip op. (Wash.
1987)(noting misappropriator's failure to develop trade secret technology inde-
pendently), aff'd 738 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1987). But see, eg., Saunders v. Florence
Enameling Co., 540 So. 2d 651, 655 (Ala. 1988)(prohibiting independent develop-
ment of the trade secret technology); Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d
223, 226-28 (5th Cir. 1968).
112. See notes 160-68 & accompanying text infra.
113. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th
Cir. 1965)(startup); Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, 325 F. Supp. 1209,
1219 (E.D. Va. 1970)(small).
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If a trade secret holder sells a product susceptible to reverse engineer-
ing, the misappropriator could have acquired a legitimate head start
from an analysis of the publicly available product. In a similar man-
ner, the products of legitimate replicators might provide a boost to
later replicators. A replicator with great resources, or with the advan-
tage of newly available technology, may be able to shorten the legiti-
mate replication period.
The period the misappropriator would have taken to legitimately
develop the trade secret technology is thus necessarily a subjective de-
termination. The development time taken by the trade secret holder
or third-party replicators may be relevant but only to the extent it
assists in determining the time the misappropriator would have taken.
There is, of course, no sure way to measure this period except by
requiring the defendant to reverse engineer or independently
reproduce the product without benefit of the trade secrets. If the mis-
appropriator cannot prove the ability to reverse engineer in a particu-
lar time period, he should be enjoined from its use until he actually
reverse engineers the technology. This places the misappropriator in
precisely the position occupied by legitimate replicators. It prevents
misappropriators from stealing what they cannot make themselves
and then simply biding their time during the period necessary for
some "average" competitor to replicate the technology legitimately.
This makes compensatory sense for both good and bad faith misap-
propriators. Absent contrary evidence, it is unlikely that bad faith
misappropriators would have begun legitimate replication efforts at
the time they misappropriated the trade secrets, or that they would
have completed replication within the same period as legitimate repli-
cators. Innocent misappropriators, such as those who purchase tech-
nology in good faith and use due diligence to develop that technology,
are more likely to prove they would have legitimately replicated the
trade secret in a definite period.114 Nevertheless, if innocent misap-
propriators cannot prove they would have replicated the technology
legitimately, a better result would seem to be a royalty injunction that
allows them to market the product under the name of the trade secret
holder until the innocent misappropriator has received a fair return
on the innocent, but hapless, investment.1 1 5 To continue using the
trade secret after obtaining this return, the misappropriator should,
like any other misappropriator, be required to prove the ability to re-
verse engineer within a given period, and failing that should be en-
joined until it can actually reverse engineer the trade secret by
independent means.
While the misappropriator's ability to prove its capability to re-
U4. See note 102 & accompanying text supra.
U5. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs AcT § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449 (1985).
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verse engineer will vary with the circumstances, a review of the range
of likely situations will afford some indication of likely injunctive pe-
riods. The subjective test will produce different results depending
upon the information publicly available about the trade secret tech-
nology, the novelty of that technology, and the capabilities and re-
sources of the misappropriator. The amount of public information
available to the misappropriator falls into three general categories: no
information, partial information revealed by the trade secret holder
(for example, by express disclosure in press releases or indirectly
through sales of a product susceptible to reverse engineering), and
complete public disclosure and termination of the trade secret, often
by way of the grant of a patent on the technology.
1. No Information
Where the trade secret holder has disclosed no public information,
and no replicators have legitimately developed the technology, the
compensatory remedy will often be an indefinite injunction that pro-
hibits disclosure or use of the trade secret until the misappropriator
independently replicates the trade secret. This is the proper measure
of the commercial advantage obtained by the misappropriator where
the niisappropriator cannot prove it could and would have successfully
reverse engineered or independently reproduced the product or pro-
cess without the trade secret information. If the misappropriator has
the capability for efficient legitimate replication, that will shortly be
borne out. If the misappropriator cannot replicate the technology,
that, too, is revealing.
The indefinite injunction will occur most often in two situations
where no information has become public. First, where the misappro-
priation occurs at the development stage and no product or other in-
formation is publicly available.116 Second, where a product
incorporating the trade secret is marketed, but commercial use does
not expose the trade secret to feasible--even if time- and cost-inten-
sive-reverse engineering. While the implausibility of reverse engi-
neering may in certain instances seem easy to ascertain,1 i7 it is
important for courts to be aware that even where the possibility of
reverse engineering might seem straightforward from a layperson's
view of modern science, it has not always been achieved.11s
116. Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 206-07 (Ill. 1980);
Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 225-26 (5th Cir. 1968); Sperry-
Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, 325 F. Supp. 1209, 1212-17 (E.D. Va. 1970);
Syntex Opthamalics, Inc. v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
117. E.g., Plant Indus. Inc. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1968)(trade
secret process for manufacturing citrus peel products with long shelf life consid-
ered "'simple' by modern science and industry").
118. See note 93 supra.
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Providing a lead-time injunction with a definite termination date
would unfairly benefit misappropriators facing these two situations.
The assumption that replication will occur at all, and especially within
a particular period, is highly speculative in this setting. A lead-time
injunction would nevertheless guarantee the success of a misap-
propriator's replication effort, placing it ahead of the starting point for
legitimate competitors and assuring the misappropriator that its devel-
opment effort will not be futile.
This is especially true of trade secrets that are highly novel. Where
no third party has successfully reverse engineered or independently
developed the technology, there should be significant skepticism about
the misappropriator's hypothetical contentions of successful independ-
ent development. The more novel the trade secret, the more likely
that skepticism is appropriate.
In a similar manner, the greater the misappropriator's deficits in
the necessary investments, in money, equipment, talent, or commer-
cial testing, the more likely that skepticism is appropriate.119
There will, of course, be objections to this approach. It will be said
that requiring untainted subcontracting exacts a cost upon the misap-
propriator's ability to utilize her unique talents as an employee. This
is true. Nevertheless, the bad faith misappropriator has already
evinced her lack of faith in her own ability to develop the trade secret
technology by legitimate means. And in the event she can prove she
would have legitimately replicated the technology, she can still receive
an injunction for a definite period.120
Requiring untainted reverse engineering or independent develop-
ment is also unlikely to penalize the innocent misappropriator un-
fairly. She also has an opportunity to prove that she could have
legitimately replicated the technology within a definite period. An
"innocent" misappropriator who purchased the trade secret technol-
ogy from a bad faith misappropriator also has a cause of action against
the bad faith misappropriator for the damage she incurred.
Moreover, purchasers of technology have a duty to exercise reason-
able due diligence to ascertain the legitimacy of the purchase. Con-
sider the common factual situations that produce innocent
misappropriation. These occur by and large in the purchase of tech-
nology in the good faith belief that the seller obtained the technology
appropriately and has the right to sell it.121 Where a buyer decides to
purchase technology rather than develop the technology, the buyer
has already decided the technology has some value beyond that readily
available in the industry and should be readily aware of the need to
119. See notes 160-68 & accompanying text infra.
120. See notes 127-41, 154-59 & accompanying text infra.
121. See, e.g., RESTATEmENT OF ToRTs § 758 (1939)(providing that purchaser of tech-
nology without notice of misappropriation is not liable for its use prior to notice).
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determine the technology's provenance. Where the misappropriator is
hiring an employee because of the employee's special technical knowl-
edge, the buyer also is aware of the need to determine whether that
knowledge is part of the general skills of that position, and if not,
whether the employee or the previous employer is entitled to take ad-
vantage of the specialized knowledge.
Finally, innocent misappropriation is least likely to occur where
there are no legitimate replicators of the trade secret, for in that in-
stance the need for rigorous due diligence prior to purchase is the
most obvious. Where no one has replicated a valuable trade secret,
such as the Coca-Cola formula or the Curtiss-Wright piston, 22 or
where a prior employer has been developing a particular technology, it
is much less likely that the special technology advertised for sale is the
legitimate property of the seller than it is when several people or enti-
ties in an industry have developed the same new edge. It is reasonable
to expect a purchaser in good faith to require substantial evidence
from the seller that establishes legitimate replication. 2 s Where the
purchaser exercises no such due diligence, one may reasonably ques-
tion the purchaser's good faith.
2. Some Public Information
Where there is publicly available information, but no termination
of the trade secret, evidence regarding reverse engineering or in-
dependent development by third parties is relevant but not disposi-
tive.124 The number of third parties who have replicated the
technology, and their investments made to achieve that result, must
be compared with the misappropriator's ability to make the same
investments.
122. See note 93 & accompanying text supra.
123. Where an employee leaves a company with knowledge of a secret development
program, it will be difficult for the new employer to determine the veracity of the
employee's claims of independent development. Here, however, the new em-
ployer has the ability to determine what contractual arrangement, if any, existed
between the employee and her old company, and the new employer can proceed
against the employee, should the employee mislead the new employer. Rather
than having to establish fraud, the new employer may wish to bind the new em-
ployee to an indemnity agreement holding the new employer harmless from suc-
cessful claims of trade secret misappropriation by the employee. The inclusion of
such a clause will encourage both employer and employee to consider realistically
the possibility of misappropriation. While this result is not perfect, given the ad-
mitted difficulty of identifying trade secrets and the burden placed on employee
movement, it is better than authorizing a misappropriator to compete with the
trade secret holder at a definite future time based solely on its misappropriation
of the holder's trade secret, and not on its proven ability to engage in legitimate
replication.
124. E.g., Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865, 869-70 (ll. 1965)(third party
had reverse engineered signal flasher technology).
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The misappropriator will usually have greater or fewer resources
than some abstract average of legitimate replicators, and the injunc-
tive period should vary accordingly. 2 5 The more novel or investment-
intensive the technology, the more likely that actual replication
should be required.
Where there is no public information but third parties have inde-
pendently replicated the trade secret technology, it will be more diffi-
cult to determine whether the defendant has the capability to
legitimately replicate the trade secret, as others have. This situation
will occur rarely and can be treated for most purposes in the same
manner as the situation where public sale of a product that incorpo-
rates the trade secret provides useful information for legitimate re-
verse engineering. Of course, the lack of publicly available
information will make it less likely that a definite-period injunction
will issue than in a situation where a product on the market assists
those attempting reverse engineering. As a general proposition, a
small number of replicators of a sophisticated and creative technology
in a large industry would suggest, all other things being equal, that the
misappropriator should face an indefinite injunction that requires it to
produce the technology legitimately. A large proportion of legitimate
replicators in a given industry, or trade secret technologies of little
novelty, would be more likely addressed by an injunction for a definite
period, based on the misappropriator's resources compared with other
developers of the technology.
3. Post-Disclosure Cases
The final category of cases is the post-disclosure category of cases.
This is the category that spawned both Shelimar and Conmar, and is
the only type of case to which they should have been applied. The
essential disagreement in those cases was whether there was justifica-
tion to enjoin the misappropriator after the trade secret had ceased.126
Where the trade secret is fully disclosed, the injunction should calcu-
late the time necessary for the misappropriator, and not some abstract
average legitimate competitor, to reach the market after learning the
trade secret.
125. E.g., Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, 325 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. Va.
1970)(noting impact of company's small size on analysis of length of injunction);
see notes 160-68 & accompanying text infra.
126. See notes 60-70 & accompanying text supra. Courts often suggest that bad faith
provides that justification. Without opining on whether bad faith should ever al-
low an injunction longer than the commercial advantage obtained by the misap-
propriator, this article proposes the appropriate effect of bad faith on
compensatory trade secret injunctions. See notes 154-59 & accompanying text
infra.
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B. Calculating the Length of the Injunction
1. Discerning the Legitimate Replction Period
Whenever the court sets a definite period, it must make the plain-
tiff whole by placing both plaintiff and misappropriator in the posi-
tions they would have occupied absent the misappropriation. The
injunction must run for the period from the defendant's actual replica-
tion of the trade secret product or service (usually by marketing the
product) to the point at which the defendant would have replicated
the product or service through legitimate means.U7 This difference is
the period of commercial advantage produced by the misappropria-
tion. It prohibits commercial use of the replicated trade secret for the
same length of time the misappropriator would have been without
that technology had it legitimately replicated the trade secret.
This calculation assumes the defendant would have commenced le-
gitimate replication on the same day the defendant misappropriated
the trade secret. 28 If, however, the defendant would not have com-
menced legitimate replication until a later date, then the defendant
has gained a greater advantage.129 For example, if the defendant
would not have commenced legitimate replication until two months
after the misappropriation, it would have reached the market two
months later than if it had commenced legitimate replication on the
127. It may be helpful to show this schematically:
Date of Date product is marketed
misappropriation using the misappropriated
trade secretI I "
Date legitimate Date product would
replication would have been marketed
have commenced absent absent misappropriation
misappropriation
Length of injunction
128. See, e.g., A.L. Laboratories, Inc. v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 385 (9th Cir.
1986).
129. Several differing situations in the marketplace will produce later commencement
dates for legitimate replication. For example, at the time of the misappropria-
tion, the misappropriator might not have the financial or human resources, or the
machinery, to take on the larger task of legitimate replication. The commence-
ment date for those lacking such resources must be delayed at least until those
resources are available. Even on that date would the misappropriator have cho-
sen to attempt legitimate replication? Another example is a business formed, or
a division added to an existing business, simply to capitalize on the misappropri-
ated trade secret. In these situations, the opportunity for the misappropriation
may be the only reason the business was started. Legitimate replication would
usually have commenced later, if at all.
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date of the misappropriation. To calculate the injunction, then, one
must determine two periods: (a) when the defendant would have com-
menced and concluded legitimate replication, and (b) when the de-
fendant reached the market after misappropriating the trade secret.130
Take an example from the case law. In Winston Research 131 the
Mincom Division of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing had devel-
oped high fidelity precision tape recorders. In May 1962, Mincom em-
ployees misappropriated the trade secret design for the recorders, left
Mincom, and established Winston Research. Winston Research pro-
duced a competing product in July 1963.132
To determine the appropriate injunction, one must determine how
much later, if at all, Winston Research would have legitimately repli-
cated the tape recorders in the absence of the misappropriation. Here
the case provides little help, because that question was not asked. It is
possible that Winston Research would never have been formed absent
the opportunity to misappropriate the trade secrets. In that event, an
indefinite injunction that required legitimate replication would be
appropriate.
On the other hand, Winston Research might be able to prove that
at some point it would have been formed and commenced legitimate
replication. The earliest likely date for this would have been March
1964 when Mincom's trade secrets were disclosed through an amalga-
mation of public announcements, demonstrations, and sales of ma-
chines that incorporated the trade secrets.-33
If Winston Research had commenced reproduction in March 1964,
the next question would be how long Winston Research would have
taken to replicate the product legitimately. Here, the opinion again
130. See note 127 supra.
131. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); see notes 71-77 & accompanying text supra.
132. It is helpful to lay out the relevant dates schematically.
May 1, 1962 July 1, 1963
1 .1
Misappropriation Replication using
misappropriated
trade secret
March 1, 1964 or later November 1, 1965 or laterI . I
Legitimate replication Legitimate replication
would have commenced would have
(public disclosure) been completed
July 1 1963 November 1, 1965
Length of injunction
133. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141 (9th
Cir. 1965).
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provides insufficient information. It first provides an objective stan-
dard: The "approximate period it would require a legitimate Mincom
competitor to develop a successful machine after public disclosure of
the secret information .... ,"134 The court then affirms a two-year
injunction. The court reasoned that the fourteen months Winston Re-
search took replicating a product from the trade secret information
was a good starting point, and the district court added some portion of
the ten additional months to compensate Mincom for the advantage
provided by the trade secret over the information that was publicly
available.135 To calculate the conclusion of legitimate replication accu-
rately, one would have to look at Winston Research's resources, begin-
ning at the time it commenced replication. Assume that Winston
Research proves that it could have replicated the product within
twenty months after Mincom's March 1, 1964, public disclosure of the
trade secret, thus by November 1, 1965. One can then calculate the
proper injunctive period: Twenty-eight months, the period from Win-
ston Research's replication of the product using the misappropriated
information (July 1, 1963) through the time Winston would have legit-
imately reached the market (November 1, 1965).
One cannot draw false comfort about the accuracy of Winston Re-
search's approach by noting that twenty-eight months is somewhat
close to the actual twenty-four month injunction. The result is hypo-
thetical. To determine the injunctive period accurately, the court
would have had to apply a subjective test calculating the commence-
ment and conclusion of legitimate replication, after first being satis-
fied that Winston Research could and would have legitimately
replicated the trade secret absent the opportunity to misappropriate it.
The court instead touted an objective standard (although the trial
court's application may have been subjective) and then sought to
award the period necessary for legitimate replication (the period nec-
essary for independent replication), not the period of commercial ad-
vantage (the period from replicating the product illegitimately to the
date of legitimate replication).136
134. Id. at 142.
135. The district court added the remaining (and unallotted) portion of the ten
months because the departure of the employees slowed Mincom's development.
The court did not address whether this was justified, because Winston Research
had not raised that question. Id. at 143.
136. Barclay has suggested a model with some of these elements, but it remains objec-
tive and can be applied only where the misappropriator actually reached the pro-
duction stage. Barclay, supra note 12, at 219-21. Unfortunately, Barclay
expressly suggests using the date a legitimate competitor reached the market.
While the time legitimate competitors reach the market may be helpful, it is only
to shed light on the appropriate question of when the misappropriator would
have legitimately reached the market absent misappropriation. Barclay also does
not recognize the importance of asking when the misappropriator would have
commenced legitimate replication. His model asks simply for the difference of
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Many misappropriators, unlike the defendant in Winston Re-
search, never reach the market using the trade secret. In these cases,
one can still calculate when the misappropriator would have com-
menced and completed legitimate replication. The injunction will last
until the date the defendant actually would have reached the market
legitimately.13 7 For example, applying the proposed model confirms
that the court in AL. Laboratories issued the correct injunction,
although the opinion's analysis is cursory and poorly explained.38
Two drug companies had sought FDA approval for an animal drug,
zinc bacitracin. The FDA required various scientific data in the ap-
proval process, and maintained the confidentiality of that data.139
Philips Roxane misappropriated confidential testing information that
belonged to A.L. Laboratories and the court enjoined Philips Roxane
for about eleven weeks, from May 6, 1985, through August 27, 1985.
As the appellate opinion recognizes, somewhat rarely among current
cases, the calculation must determine when the misappropriator
would have commenced legitimate replication. The court determined
that Philips Roxane would have begun independent legitimate re-
search immediately had it not misappropriated the information of
A.L. Laboratories on May 28, 1981.140 The court calculated that
Philips Roxane would have taken fifty-one months to complete legiti-
mate replication, or until August 27, 1985. The court concluded that
"retroactive" application of a fifty-one month injunction from May 28,
1981 was the appropriate remedy.' 4 '
This "retroactive" analysis is misleading. There can be no such
thing as a retroactive injunction. A court cannot prohibit someone
from taking acts in the past. This article's proposed model is more
straightforward. One simply calculates the time when the misap-
propriator would have commenced and concluded legitimate replica-
tion and enjoins the misappropriator until it would have legitimately
replicated the trade secret. This erases any time-based benefit
time between the defendant's illegitimate production and the legitimate competi-
tor's production.
137. For a schematic diagram applying this calculation, see note 141 infra.
138. 803 F.2d 378 (8th Cir. 1986).
139. Id. at 380.
140. Id. at 385.
141. Id. at 384-85. It may be helpful, once again, to lay out the relevant dates
schematically.
May 28, 1981 May 6, 1985 August 27, 1985
Commencement of Final Conclusion of
legitimate judgment legitimate
replication replication
Length of injunction
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achieved by the misappropriation by preventing the misappropriator
from using the replicated trade secret until it would have legitimately
been able to do so.
2. Nonuse Claims
Recognizing that the proper question is when the misappropriator
would have commenced legitimate replication absent the misappropri-
ation sheds helpful light on the inaccuracy of deducting from the in-
junction any period a misappropriator forebears from using the trade
secret technology. Courts are divided on this issue.14 2 The critical
step to erase the commercial advantage is generally forced nonuse for
a period equal to the commercial advantage. Voluntary nonuse may
be, and usually is, undertaken for reasons other than the misap-
propriator's self-imposed penance. When the misappropriator chooses
for other reasons not to use the trade secret, nonuse does not erase the
advantage represented by the misappropriation. When, long after the
misappropriation, the misappropriator decides to commence replica-
tion using the trade secret technology, the misappropriator still avoids
the extra costs, resources, and time necessary to create that technol-
ogy legitimately. Its replication period using the misappropriated in-
formation is still shorter and less expensive than legitimate
replication would have been.
It is also important to recognize that a "nonuse" claim may mean
only that the misappropriator has not yet produced a competing prod-
uct.143 The defendant may yet market a product on the basis of the
trade secret technology and thus still attain an advantage from its use.
Making the plaintiff whole, however, requires that the defendant re-
ceive no benefit from the misappropriation.
For example, in Northern Petrochemical the defendant, Surfact,
attempted to develop a fabric softener using misappropriated informa-
tion but was set back, at least in part, because its factory was de-
stroyed.144 The appellate court affirmed the denial of a preliminary
injunction for the misappropriation, which had taken place eight years
before the appellate decision. The plaintiff, Northern Petrochemical,
had conceded that legitimate replication would take five years or less,
and the court reasoned that no injunction was warranted because the
defendant had not yet produced a fabric softener eight years after the
misappropriation. The court concluded that the reason for the ab-
142. E.g., Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 457 (8th Cir. 1987)(no
deduction); Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1061 (7th
Cir. 1973)(deduction).
143. E.g., Affiliated Hospital Prod. v. Baldwin, 373 N.E.2d 1000 (I1. 1978); Northern
Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1058-61 (7th Cir. 1973)(affirming
decision not to grant injunction because no product had been marketed).
144. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir. 1973).
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sence of commercial manufacture during those years was irrelevant
and that Surfact's "voluntary abstention" from commercial production
compensated Northern Petrochemical as well as an injunction would
have.145
This reasoning is highly suspect. In the first place, it shares the
faults of the cases automatically commencing the legitimate replica-
tion period from the date of the misappropriation rather than asking
when the misappropriator would have commenced legitimate replica-
tion absent the misappropriation.146 The defendant, Surfact, was in
fact using the trade secret technology during that period and was set
back by an explosion at its plant. This is hardly "voluntary
abstention."147
But Northern Petrochemical's denial of any remedy is more deeply
flawed. Surfact has still obtained a commercial benefit from the mis-
appropriation despite its failure to market a softener by the date of the
court's opinion. The explosion at its plant forced a period of downtime
whether or not the halted effort was legitimate. Development efforts
would be necessary after rebuilding the factory, whether Surfact was a
legitimate replicator or a misappropriator. The misappropriator has
still escaped the requirement to perform legitimate replication and
should still be enjoined from using the trade secret for the period nec-
essary to match the period of commercial advantage the misappropria-
tion provided.
There was no showing in Northern Petrochemical that anyone,
much less the misappropriator, had replicated Northern's trade secret
technology by legitimate means. Thus, that decision would protect
(and may have protected) a misappropriator who simply bides its time
and then claims to the court that the time for independent replication
is past and it should now be free to compete. Depending upon the
breadth of the misappropriation, such a misappropriator avoids the
cost of trial-and-error research, reduces the risk of failure, and
reduces the costs of development. Northern Petrochemical is thus re-
duced to the unacceptable proposition that the misappropriator may
market a product developed from the trade secret as soon as the myth-
ical average period for legitimate replication expires. No showing of
the misappropriator's own abilities or efforts would be required.
The proper result is quite to the contrary. Northern Petrochemical
is a rare case in which the court had an opportunity to impose an in-
junction in time to prevent any commercial advantage.48 Without the
145. Id. at 1061.
146. See notes 97-102 and accompanying text supra.
147. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir. 1973).
148. Despite these flaws in the injunctive analysis of Northern Petrochemical, its
reader is left feeling that the decision to deny relief may still be accurate. There
may well have been other, more defensible grounds to affirm. The trial court in
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trade secret technology, the slower Surfact would likely never have
marketed a fabric softener incorporating the trade secret technology.
Indeed, Northern Petrochemical notes that one could not reverse engi-
neer the trade secret information from a review of the marketed prod-
uct.149 But for the misappropriation, it is likely that Surfact could
never bring a product to the market. Under those facts, the court
should issue an indefinite injunction requiring legitimate replication.
Assume, on the other hand, that Surfact eventually produced a
fabric softener based on the misappropriated information. Surfact
might have been slower than the average replicator, but this does not
undercut the benefit it gained. Indeed, it suggests that the benefit was
even greater than it would have been for the average replicator.
Where a misappropriator does not use the trade secret for a period it
should be treated as would any other business that chooses to put off
investment-it should gain no benefit. This situation should be
treated no differently from any other. The court should determine
when the misappropriator would have commenced legitimate replica-
tion, if at all, absent the misappropriation and should set the injunc-
tion to expire when legitimate replication would have completed.150
When the defendant expresses a current intent to replicate but cannot
prove it would have started earlier, the injunction should last the full
period required for legitimate'replication. The commencement of le-
gitimate replication efforts in Northern Petrochemical might have oc-
curred, absent misappropriation, sometime before the plant explosion.
Whether or not Surfact should have been enjoined for a period equal
to the full legitimate replication period, there is no doubt that it
should have been enjoined.
3. The Effect of a Preliminary Injunction
One issue raised by the cases is whether the period during which
the defendant is preliminarily enjoined should count toward the pe-
riod under the permanent injunction.15 1 This analysis appears reason-
Northern Petrochemical denied an injunction on the general ground that the
plaintiff had failed to show it was likely to succeed on the merits. It is unclear
why the appellate court chose to rest its decision on the questionable proposition
that a trade secret injunction necessarily should run from the date of the
misappropriation.
149. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1061 & n.6 (7th Cir.
1973).
150. The date of concluding legitimate replication will necessarily be after the date of
the final judgment issuing the injunction. Otherwise, the defendant would have
produced a product before final judgment, and the court would have calculated
the period of commercial advantage as described above, using Winston Research
as an example. See notes 131-36 & accompanying text supra.
151. E.g., K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974)(remanding to
trial court to decide whether period of preliminary injunction should be counted
toward period awarded for permanent injunctive relief).
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ably straightforward. To the extent the preliminary injunction
enjoins the same conduct as the permanent injunction, it prevents the
misappropriator from using the trade secrets and should be counted
toward the total period.152 This is true even though the preliminary
injunction doubtlessly also serves additional purposes, such as preserv-
ing the status quo.153
Of course, if the scope of the preliminary and permanent injunc-
tions differ, the injunctive calculations also will differ. The com-
mencement date of the preliminary injunction will be used for the
technology it covers, and that of the permanent injunction will be used
for any additional technology.
It should be recognized, however, that for good reason courts may
not be able, or willing, to fine-tune the injunction on the basis of the
limited information generally available in a preliminary injunction
hearing. Factual issues can only be decided by the fact-finder at trial
and may include complicated disputes of fact crucial to setting the
length of the injunction. This necessarily risks imposing a prelimi-
nary injunction longer than that necessary to compensate the trade
secret holder. This risk is better than dissolving an injunction in the
face of disputed facts that, at trial, may establish that the injunction
should have continued.
Courts and counsel will undoubtedly exercise their ingenuity in
crafting remedies to compensate the misappropriator for any excess
period. Obvious suggestions include preventing the trade secret
holder from claiming monetary damages for the excess portion of the
period. At one extreme, the innocent misappropriator with estab-
lished sales might be awarded the value of the sales it would have
made during the excess portion of the period. At the other extreme,
the bad faith misappropriator without established sales might be de-
nied any relief as too speculative. After all, the bad faith misap-
propriator risked the costs of litigation against it, of which this is one.
Moreover, those preliminarily enjoined in other areas of the law regu-
larly (albeit without compensatory justification) incur uncompensated
costs and damages during the period through trial. Any difficulty in
establishing a remedy for an overlong preliminary injunction should
not exclude the trade secret holder from the remedy of an injunction
necessary to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable harm
through trial.
152. See Lamb-Weston v. McCain Foods, 941 F.2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1991)(holding
that an eight-month preliminary injunction had served the same purpose a per-
manent injunction would have, and dissolving injunction); Sanitary Farm Dairies,
Inc. v. Wolf, 112 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1961)(similar reasoning).
153. Cf. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974) (suggesting that
the preliminary injunctive period should count toward the permanent period if
both serve the same purpose).
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C. The Impact of Bad Faith on Compensatory Remedies
The bad faith of the misappropriator is relevant to a compensatory
remedy. All other things being equal, the decision of the defendant to
misappropriate the trade secret reasonably implies one of two facts.
Either the defendant did not believe it could legitimately produce the
trade secret technology, or the defendant believed misappropriation
would avoid the substantial investments necessary for its own legiti-
mate reproduction of the trade secret technology. 5 4 It is reasonable
to infer that the bad faith misappropriator could not reproduce the
trade secret technology by permissible means, and she should be re-
quired to provide evidence to prove otherwise. This rebuttable pre-
sumption does no more, if it remains unrebutted, than require the
misappropriator to do what she was legally required to do in the first
place.
This presumption simply incorporates into the compensatory
framework the understanding of bad faith already exhibited in the
award of punitive injunctions. Several cases granting indefinite in-
junctions and citing bad faith or high standards of commercial moral-
ity as the justification also exhibit facts suggesting that the
misappropriator might have found it very difficult or impossible to
replicate the trade secret legitimately.155 These courts have properly
recognized that injunctions of definite lengths are often inappropriate
but have simply postponed the time when they must determine under
what circumstances the injunction should be terminated, if at all.
154. cf Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., slip op. at 3 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Case No. 84-2-
11826-1, July 31,1985)(providing misappropriator an opportunity to prove it could
develop the trade secret technology without using the trade secret), supersedeas
bond denied, Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., slip op. (Wash.)(noting misap-
propriator's failure to develop trade secret technology independently), aff'd 738
P.2d 665 (Wash. 1987); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App.
2d 157, 166 (1958)(tried and failed).
155. Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs. v. Digital Transactions, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1054, 1057
(2d Cir. 1990)(new combination of known computer "utility programs" could not
be "readily duplicated" without the trade secret information); Boeing Co. v. Sier-
racin Corp., slip op. at 3 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Case No. 84-2-11826-1, July 31,1985)(pro-
viding misappropriator an opportunity to prove it could develop the trade secret
technology without using the trade secret), supersedeas bond denied Boeing Co.
v. Sierracin Corp., slip op. (Wash.)(noting misappropriator's failure to develop
trade secret technology independently), aff'd 738 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1987); Saun-
ders v. Florence Enameling Co., 540 So. 2d 651, 653-55 (Ala. 1988)(process for
manufacturing enamel-coated fluxing pipe without blemishes was unique and ap-
parently disclosed only by furnace process and not by pipe itself); Wolfe v. Tuthill
Corp., 532 N.E,2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1988); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die
Co., 407 N.E.2d 319, 326 & n.8 (Mass. 1980); cf. Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation,
358 N.E.2d 804, 807-08 (Mass. 1976)(revisiting the issue of injunctive relief upon
the enjoined party's claim of changed circumstances, and holding that a lead-time
injunction is the minimum relief but bad faith could justify greater relief).
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These decisions suggest the impact bad faith should have on the com-
pensatory remedy.
Massachusetts has, indeed, expressly recognized that bad faith and
traditional compensatory analysis are appropriate factors in fixing an
injunction for trade secret misappropriation.L5  While the Massachu-
setts approach certainly still contains a strong punitive aspect, it
evinces some willingness to consider terminations of indefinite injunc-
tions-which is underscored by the Eastern Marble opinion consider-
ing a motion to dissolve an injunction.157 This is a hopeful sign, for it
shows an attempt to come to grips with the appropriate standard for
terminating indefinite injunctions. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts
approach expressly considers only the punitive aspect of bad faith mis-
appropriation and has not found a method to regularize the impact of
bad faith in fashioning injunctions. This loose test, coupled with the
wide discretion given to Massachusetts courts in applying the test,158
will produce conflicting and inconsistent results.59 Incorporating the
recognition of bad faith into the compensatory analysis will provide
more coherent guidance that ensures an accurate compensatory
remedy.
Courts should readily adopt this approach. The bad faith misap-
propriator has, by his own conduct, placed himself in a position that
makes it more difficult for him to prove his ability to accomplish legit-
imate replication. This presumption simply requires him to bear the
risk of failing to prove that ability.
D. The Impact of Non-time Investments
The calculation of the injunctive time period must reflect all of the
various investments, in addition to the time necessary for the commer-
cially viable research and development of a trade secret. In order to
place the misappropriator in the position it would have been in using
legitimate replication, the fact-finder must recognize that in many
156. E.g., Eastern Marble Prod. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 799, 804
(Mass. 1977)(noting that an indefinite injunction is a possible remedy, that the
injunction must be at least for the period of commercial advantage, and that bad
faith is an appropriate factor); Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, 358 N.E.2d 804,
808 (Mass. 1976)(bad faith can justify an injunction exceeding the period of com-
mercial advantage); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co.,
407 N.E.2d 319, 326 & n.8 (Mass. 1980)(affirming indefinite relief where the mis-
appropriator acted in bad faith and could not prove an ability to replicate by legit-
imate means).
157. E.g., Eastern Marble Prod. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 799, 804
(Mass. 1977)(remanding after motion to dissolve for trial court to determine
whether trade secret still existed).
158. E.g., id. at 804.
159. For example, Greenberg's termination clause would arguably be acceptable under
this approach even though its objective termination standard is obviously wrong.
Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 27, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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cases the more labor, talent, and money thrown into the effort, the
less time reverse engineering will take. Once this is recognized, the
misappropriator must provide compensation to the trade secret holder
for the combined benefit received. This will allow a range of possible
injunctive periods and investment damages. At one end, a shorter pe-
riod and higher monetary damages, and at the other end a longer pe-
riod and lower monetary damages. The range will be bounded by the
capabilities of the misappropriator at the date of the initial investment
in legitimate trade secret technology development. As with other
choices among relief, the successful trade secret plaintiff should have
the ability to select the form of damages he wishes to receive, so that
the trade secrets plaintiff will choose the point on the range at which
he wishes to be compensated.
There will be situations where the misappropriator simply did not
have the resources, at the time of the misappropriation, to develop the
trade secret technology legitimately. In these situations, a lead-time
injunction that matches the lead time of other competitors unfairly
benefits the misappropriator, who is allowed to use the trade secret
technology although it could not have begun legitimately replicating
the technology until later, if at all. Such a misappropriator should
face an indefinite injunction until he amasses the necessary resources,
at which point the definite-period injunction should commence.
This remedy for non-time investments seems straightforward.
This commentator is not the first to point out the need to consider
non-time investments, 6 0 and courts on occasion do address the issue
and award monetary relief for non-time investments.' 6 ' Unfortu-
nately, however, the point bears emphasis because most courts still do
not discuss non-time investments.162 Those that do take note of non-
time investments do not always provide relief for the benefit accorded
to the defendant.163
This failure to incorporate non-time investments as an essential
160. See Barclay, supmr, note 12 at 219-20 n. 70.
161. E.g., Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die, 485 F. Supp. 410, 418 (E.D. Pa.
1980)($100,000 awarded as non-time investment that was necessary, along with a
year of effort, to develop trade secret technology); A.L. Laboratories v. Philips
Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 383 (8th Cir. 1986) (recounting trial court's analysis of
and award of non-time investments, although reversing the trial court on other
grounds).
162. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205 (IMI. 1980), North-
ern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973); Winston Re-
search Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
163. E.g., Sperry-Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (4th Cir. 1971)(overturn-
ing as a double recovery an award of non-time investments that in fact was neces-
sary to reflect the benefit to the defendant); Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Electronic
Concepts, 325 F. Supp. 1209,1216,1219 (E.D. Va. 1970)(including non-time invest-
ments only to be reversed on appeal without consideration of the non-time invest-
ments); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865, 869 (IM. 1965)(recognizing
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component of trade secrets damages, and one necessarily interdepen-
dent with the time calculation, is highlighted by the strange develop-
ment of the injunctive relief in Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky.164
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, applying Illinois law,
reviewed an injunction that prohibited the defendant from using the
trade secret technology for rigid gas permeable contacts for twenty
years. 6 5 This period was set according to testimony that twenty years
in labor hours were spent developing the trade secret. The appellate
court recognized that these hours of labor were actually expended in
less than two years and reduced the injunctive period dramatically, to
eight years from the departure of the former employee and four years
from the commencement of the preliminary injunction. 6 6 While the
appellate court reduced the period dramatically, it required no award
of compensatory damages to reflect the benefit to the misappropriator
of the dramatic number of labor hours worked. Because the court ap-
peared to accept the labor hours as accurate, the lack of any considera-
tion of this point clearly points out the general failure to recognize the
inevitable tradeoff between time and non-time investments and the
need, in most instances, for both.
One problem in gaining court acceptance of the legitimacy of non-
time investments is the standard description of monetary damages for
trade secret violations. These are typically described as a choice be-
tween valuing the loss to the plaintiff or the unjust enrichment re-
ceived by the misappropriator. While the plaintiff is free to choose the
higher of the two, the reward of both would provide a double recov-
ery.'6 7 Yet, whether or not the plaintiff loses sales, or the defendant
obtains sales, the plaintiff has undoubtedly provided to the defendant
an investment in time, labor, and other capital resources, and to make
the plaintiff whole the defendant must wait for the calculated period
and compensate the plaintiff for the benefit of the labor and other
capital resources.
Even if a defendant never produces a marketable replica, and has
not been attempting such replication, it may still have gained commer-
cially valuable information through the misappropriation. For exam-
ple, the review of the technology may reveal a process that requires
much more initial investment in new equipment than the misap-
propriator had expected and could provide. In such a setting, a misap-
propriator hoping to replicate the technology knows that it is too
expensive and will refrain from incurring the costs it would have in-
non-time investments in discussion but not including non-time investments in its
damage analysis).
164. 745 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 1435-37.
166. Id. at 1436-37.
167. Sperry-Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (4th Cir. 1971).
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curred had it attempted to replicate the technology legitimately. The
knowledge of what does not work, or what one cannot do, is itself an
economic benefit.168 Trial and error is part of the development period,
and the trade secret information allows the misappropriator to avoid
the error. Non-time investments deserve greater attention and consis-
tent remedies.
E. Absence of Greater Legal and Transaction Costs
Virtually every court fashioning an injunction in a trade secrets
case under the contemporary model already requires expert evidence
to apply the objective test to determine when legitimate competitors
would replicate a trade secret. The proposed model does no more than
refocus the expert's endeavors on the more appropriate issue of when
the misappropriator would have achieved legitimate replication absent
the misappropriation.
Courts are currently required to employ fairly abstract hypotheti-
cals to apply the objective test. The proposed model will admittedly
still require consideration of fairly abstract hypotheticals, but at least
the questions will be the right questions: When would the misap-
propriator have commenced and concluded legitimate replication ab-
sent the misappropriation? Moreover, the structure of the model
provides substantially more guidance than the current haphazard
fashioning of injunctive relief. This will produce greater predictability
than the current approaches, and this predictability will grow over
time, reducing transactional costs along the way.
F. Existing Law Support
The compensatory models in the common law and under UTSA
support injunctive relief that erases any commercial advantage
achieved by the misappropriation. 16 9 UTSA expressly authorizes
maximum relief up to the full life of the trade secret and any period
thereafter necessary to erase commercial advantage produced by the
misappropriation. 170 UTSA does not, however, require relief for this
entire period; UTSA provides that courts "may" enjoin misap-
propriators for this maximum period.171
The only way to eradicate the commercial advantage completely is
to place the parties where they would have been absent the misappro-
168. UNIF. TRADE SECRmS ACT § 1 cmt.; Courtesy Temporary Serv. v. Camacho, 222
Cal. App. 3d 1278, 1287-89 (1990)(efforts with negative results have commercial
value and can be protected as a trade secret); Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal
Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1980).
169. E.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 350 F.2d 134, 142 (9th
Cir. 1965); see generally Jager, supra note 26 § 7.0213][b] (reviewing cases).
170. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (1985).
171. See note 80 supra.
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priation. Both the common law and UTSA support this ideal, but the
cases have not achieved an accurate method for calculating this rem-
edy. The model developed in this article provides the necessary im-
provements for the remedy to be accurate and complete. This model
provides a standard approach to guide courts to consider all of the rel-
evant factors and ask the right questions, so that each case will include
a complete analysis and the cases will consistently award injunctive
relief that erases, but does not exceed, the misappropriator's commer-
cial advantage. This fully compensatory model will reduce the incen-
tive for courts to award punitive injunctions for fear of providing
insufficient compensation, and should harmonize the current haphaz-
ard awards of injunctive relief in trade secret cases.
